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Abstract
Historically, it has been thought that there is some connection,
whether structural or evidential, between conceivability (in a suit-
able sense) and possibility. Recent years have seen attempts to
resurrect this connection, both by means of arguing that conceiv-
ability is a guide to possibility and by arguing that conceivability
entails possibility (I call this the “royal road”). This paper con-
cerns the latter connection. I argue that such principles ought, if
they are to be thought fruitful at all, to be formulated in terms
of an idealized conceiver: something is conceivable iff an ideal
conceiver could conceive of it. I continue by arguing that, con-
strued this way, the royal road’s converse–inconceivability entails
impossibility–overgenerates impossibility claims. That is, it returns
as inconceivable things which we have good reason to believe are
possible (in some cases, actual). I conclude that this gives us reason
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Throughout the history of philosophy, conceivability has been
thought to stand in a very close relation to possiblity. Thomas Reid
reports that “[t]his opinion has been held by philosophers for more
than a hundred years without contradiction or dissent, as far as I
know.”1 He gives a list of celebrated philosophers to whom such
a belief can be ascribed; amongst the names are Samuel Clarke,
Christian Wolff, and David Hume. Similarly, Kant writes in “The
Only Possible Argument”:
[E]verything possible is something which can be
thought, and the logical relation pertains to it in
accordance with the principle of contradiction.2
Today, well over two centuries after these works were writ-
ten, there has been considerable attention paid to the connection
between epistemic modality–possibility in the sense of “true for
all I know,” necessity in terms of the a priori–and metaphysical
modality–which is somewhat more difficult to characterize in terms
of a definition. The usage in modern analytic philosophy seems to
originate primarily in Kripke:
We ask whether something might have been true,
or might have been false. Well, if something is false,
1Reid (1941), p. 256.
2Kant (2003), p. 123.
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it’s obviously not necessarily true. If it is true, might
it have been otherwise? Is it possible that, in this
respect, the world should have been different from
the way it is? If the answer is ’no’, then this fact
about the world is a necessary one. If the answer is
’yes’, then this fact about the world is a contingent
one. This in and of itself has nothing to do with anyone’s
knowledge of anything.3
Kripke draws a sharp distinction between the a priori and the
necessary, and the impulse of many philosophers has been to fol-
low him in this. Not everyone has been inclined to agree with this
assessment, and so the discussion continues today. One of the more
interesting features of the debate has been the examination of the
connection between a thing’s being conceivable–for a suitable no-
tion of “conceivable”, of which more later–and a thing’s being pos-
sible. Those who think there’s such a connection take–roughly–one
of two views. On one side, there are those who think that conceiv-
ability is a guide (though by no means a certain guide) to possibility.
On the other, there are those who think that conceivability in some
sense entails possibility. The former idea, while interesting in its
own right, is not the topic of this essay. Rather, we will be taking
up the latter notion–the question of whether conceivability entails
possibility. This I will call the “royal road” (henceforth RR). The
converse of RR is the thesis that inconceivability entails impossi-
bility. The combination of RR and its converse yields what Vaidya
(2008) calls “modal monism”:
3Kripke (1980), p. 36. Emphasis mine.
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[Modal monism] is a metaphysical thesis about the
nature of metaphysical modality and logical modal-
ity. It maintains that although metaphysical modal-
ity is notionally distinct from logical modality, the
two modalities are nevertheless extensionally equiv-
alent.45
Before we go on, some clarification is in order. Some philoso-
phers maintain that we achieve modal knowledge via counterfac-
tual reasoning. For instance, Timothy Williamson holds that knowl-
edge of metaphysical possibility is a special case of counterfactual
knowledge.6 This is not the view I will be examining in the follow-
ing pages. Rather, as stated above, I will be interested in accounts of
modal knowledge which turn on a thing’s being conceivable. Conse-
quently, when I speak of “modal monism,” I have in mind a version
of the latter whose account of epistemic possibility relies on con-
ceivability as the (or a major) source of modal knowledge. For the
purpose of this thesis, then, we will take both “modal monism”
and “epistemic possibility/modality” to carry their conceivability-
related meanings.
Returning to Reid for a moment, it is interesting to note that he
did not think conceivability was a guide to possibility:
There remains another mistake concerning concep-
tion which deserves to be noticed. It is – That our
conception of things is a test of their possibility, so
4Vaidya (2008), pp. 192–193.
5This is sometimes associated with certain interpretations of two-dimensional
semantics. For a fuller exposition of that kind of modal monism, see Chalmers
(2004), especially §3.9-3.11.
6See, e.g., Williamson (2007). for details, particularly §3.
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that, what we can distinctly conceive, we may con-
clude to be possible; and of what is impossible, we
can have no conception.7
Continuing:
[One of my reasons for believing this an error is]:
Whatever is said to be possible or impossible is
expressed by a proposition. Now, what is it to con-
ceive a proposition? I think it is no more than to
understand its meaning...I am persuaded that I un-
derstand as distinctly the meaning of this proposi-
tion, Any two sides of a triangle are together equal to
the third, as of this – Any two sides of a triangle are
together greater than the third; yet the first of these is
impossible.8
I share much the same concern.
Broadly following Reid, then, the general thrust of this thesis
goes as follows. First, under a suitable definition of inconceivable,
there are inconceivable worlds. (This sounds more dramatic than
it really is, as will become plain) Moreover, there are inconceivable
possible worlds. Still more outrageously, the actual world is an in-
conceivable world. Consequently, modal monism is false. Further–
or so the argument goes–this gives us good reason to suppose that
it is unlikely that conceivability entails possibility.
The bulk of the first chapter is devoted to constructing adequate
and reasonably general notions of conceivability. This, in turn,
helps us to adequately formulate RR properly and specifically. I
consider two broad categories of conceivability: agent-relative vs.
agent-invariant and rationalist vs. empiricist. The agent-invariant
7Reid (1941), p. 256
8ibid., p. 259.
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is cashed out in terms of what an “ideal conceiver” might be able to
find conceivable. The rationalist version determines whether or not
a thing is conceivable based primarily on contradiction-detection.
The empiricist version cashes out conceivability in terms of what an
ideal conceiver might be able to mentally, and sensorily or quasi-
sensorily, represent.
The second chapter is devoted to examining RR’s dual. The
general question of the chapter is: does inconceivability imply im-
possibility? I argue that it doesn’t, based primarily on the reasoning
that the relevant notions of conceivability entail that certain things
which we have good reason to believe are possible–indeed, actual
in some cases–are in fact impossible. This, I claim, gives us good
reason to reject the idea that inconceivability entails possibility. Fur-
thermore, though with somewhat lesser strength, I argue that this
in turn gives us good reason to reject the idea that conceivability
entails possibility.
Before going on, allow me a brief detour concerning singular
pronouns. Throughout most of the history of (modern) English, as
far as I can tell, the pronoun “he” was equally well usable as mascu-
line nominative and as neuter nominative (ditto for its accusative,
genitive, and dative cases). In current writing, this practice has
fallen out of favor. Authors of both sexes have tended to opt ei-
ther for “she” or “they” as the singular neuter (ditto, again, for
the other cases). I find the former practice peculiar; and as for the
latter, I cannot bring myself to believe that it truly is good ortho-
graphical practice to transform a plural neuter into a singular one.
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Consequently, I shall default to the following rule of usage: the
author shall use, as the singular neuter, that pronouns whose gen-
der corresponds to his own. In this paper, I will use “he” (and the
corresponding variations for the appropriate cases) in the indicated
way.
With that out of the way, we turn to the following question:





“The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs
which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible.”
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §3.02
Suppose Richard and I are having a conversation. During the
course of the dialog, I say “suppose that extraterrestrials had visited
Earth. Then—” “Hold on,” Richard responds, “how have you got
extraterrestrials in your thought experiment?” Upon reflection, I
say to him, “well, I seem to be able to conceive of a situation in
which extraterrestrials visit Earth; consequently, it’s possible that
they have or will visit Earth.” We then move on and continue in our
discussion.
But is my reasoning good? That is, does the fact that I can
conceive of P–where P is an entity, state of affairs, or what-have-
you–give me warrant to conclude that P is in fact possible? It is this
question that I will be examining in what follows.
There are at least two ways in which I might be construing the
line of reasoning presented in the hypothetical dialog. One is to say
that that conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility, but does
not actually entail it. One could think this for systematic reasons–
because our abilities to conceive of P are grounded in our con-
cepts and our concepts themselves are grounded in what is actual
13
(and therefore possible)–or one could give a heuristic or pragmatic
justification-conceivability produces more “yes” answers than “no”
answers when used to answer the question “is P possible?” This is
roughly the route taken by Stephen Yablo.
Alternately, one might say that conceivability entails possibility,
as opposed to merely providing a usually-reliable guide to modal
truths. On this view conceivability is thought to stand in some sort
of structural or logical relation to possibility, such as logical entail-
ment. Stronger versions might hold that (some suitable version of)
conceivability is, in fact, equivalent possibility. The former view has
been defended by David Chalmers, the latter by both Frank Jackson
and, in some places, Chalmers.
A related question is how we ought to construe conceivabil-
ity. One way, which appears as early as the British empiricists (in
particular Reid), is to understand conceivability as a sort of quasi-
perceptual experience, a sort of mental image.1 To conceive of P, on
this model, is to have a sort of mental representation of P. Another
way is to take conceivability as less of a sensory-based mental rep-
resentation and more a matter of examination of concepts, weighed
against each other to determine compatibility or incompatibility,
with no necessary quasi-sensory component. As such, these views
are usually rationalist or a priori in nature. Something like the for-
mer view is defended variously by Yablo and by Peter Menzies;
Chalmers has defended something like the latter.
1Though it should be noted that this was not necessarily the common use
throughout the history of philosophy.
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This section is concerned primarily with examining various en-
tailment relations which might obtain conceivability and possibility,
with the evidentiary views taking second fiddle. We will consider,
however, how we might go about converting a reliabilist or eviden-
tiary thesis of the conceivability-possibility view to an entailment
thesis. We shall also be interested in whether any relation of this
kind must be a thinker-dependent account of modal terms–that is,
whether we should not only treat conceivability as entailing pos-
sibility, but also identify it with possibility (and thus impossibility
and necessity with their conceivabilistic counterparts).
0. How might conceivability entail possibility?
There are a variety of ways into which one might split regard-
ing the role of conceivability in modal thought. For instance, Sara
Worley claims that “whether or not something is conceivable for a
thinker depends on what the thinker knows or believes, or what
concepts or modes of presentation he has available or is using to
think about the situation.”2 Another version is presented by Heir
Geirsson: “to be conceivable is to be true in a possible world, [. . . ]
where the possibility is determined by conceptual coherence or in-
coherence, and thought in terms of an ideal conceiver.”3 Similarly,
Menzies writes,“[I]t is possible that p if and only if an ideal conceiver
could conceive that p.”4
2Worley (2003), p.17.
3Geirsson (2005), p. 290.
4Menzies (1998), p. 269.
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Roca-Royes (2011) calls these epistemic and non-epistemic senses,
respectively.5 For our purposes, we’ll refer to these senses of con-
ceivability as agent-relative and agent-invariant,for reasons that
should become clear shortly.
Another way that we might divide up the concept of conceivabil-
ity is between what Murphy (2005) calls the empiricist and rational-
ist accounts. The empiricist account “[M]akes imagination central
to conceivability and inconceivability[...]Thought of this way, con-
ceivability is a two-step cognitive process: a cognizer imagines a
situation (or situations) that she takes to verify p; and this causes
her to believe that it is possible that p.”6 On the rationalist ac-
count, “[C]onceivability and inconceivability do not involve any
images or sensory-like states. Instead, they involve contradiction
detection[. . . ][F]inding p inconceivable involves detecting a con-
tradiction in p and subsequently believing that p is impossible.”7
Murphy’s terminology is both useful and illustrative, as it accu-
rately captures the salient way in which the two accounts differ:
one view takes conceivability to be an irreducibly sensory or quasi-
sensory action, while the other is concerned mostly with relations
between concepts, without reference to a particular sort of men-
tal representation. For these reasons, I will follow Murphy in this
usage.
5See Roca-Royes (2011a) for further details.
6Murphy (2006), p. 196.
7Murphy (2006), p. 197.
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There are still further ways in which one might break down the
concept of conceivability. One might be something like the follow-
ing: it is conceivable for X that P if X holds no belief inconsistent,
upon reflection, with believing that P. This is related to the rational-
ist version in a deep way, but is not identical to it. One need not
detect that there is no contradiction in believing that P in order to
find P conceivable in the sense just given. This is the rawest sort of
epistemic possibility–something is conceivable for me just in case it
might be true “for all I know.”
On the face of it, it’s not obvious which of these versions of
conceivability we should use to formulate RR. Depending on which
version of conceivability we end up using, we might in fact have
a different sort of conceivability-to-possibility principle. Since we
are interested in structural or logical relations between conceivability
and possibility, it might be useful to put the putative relation in a
formal manner. On first blush, we might write it as something like
the following:
(1) Cφ→ ^φ,
where Cφ denotes “it is conceivable that φ.”
But ought we to take C as primitive? Or ought we break it down
further, to get a better idea of the lifting it’s supposed to be doing?
If we think of “conceiving” as a primitive activity, it’s hard to know
how we might actually provide an analytical account of how this
relationship might work. Consequently, our operative assumption
will be that it can in fact be analyzed further. We might start with
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the following:
(2) Caφ =d f Ja^φ
where Ja is taken to mean “a judges that”. A great deal hinges
around the different definitions we might give to the phrase “a
judges that”. In the spirit of greater ecumenism, we’ll take “a judges
that” to mean “a carries out whatever process or activity that we take
to be constitutive of conceiving.” Hardly a concise interpretation,
but that comes at the cost of generality. We can therefore consider
different versions of our entailment relation in parallel with the
various sorts of conceivability we wish to discuss.
So, with the symbol defined thusly, we can write:
(3) Ja^φ→ ^φ
A useful–though possibly beguiling if taken too literally–way to
think of this is as a sort of elimination rule. If we’re able to reach
a point in our reasoning where we’ve got a statement of the form
“agent a judges that φ is possible,” where φ is some appropriate
proposition, entity, or state of affairs, then we’re entitled to eliminate
the “agent a judges that” bit and simply conclude “φ is possible.”
We can now consider how precisely this inference might interact
with the different sorts of conceivability given above.
1. Agent-relative vs. Agent-invariant
First, let’s examine the agent-relative sense of conceivability. In
this case, our entailment would be “if it is conceivable to a that φ,
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then it is possible that φ.” Here, we treat a as a placeholder for
whichever agent we want to consider. Now, as it stands, it turns out
that this is not truth preserving across different agents and differ-
ent φ. For instance, suppose that our agent is a standard-issue 6th
grader, and suppose that φ is the proposition “all infinite sets are of
the same size.”8 Now suppose that the 6th-grader indeed finds it
conceivable–in the sense of making proper and non-contradictory
reference to the agent’s modes of representation, beliefs, and so
forth–that all infinite sets are of equal cardinality. 9 But, of course,
that is in fact not the case–for instance, the cardinality of the contin-
uum is strictly greater than the cardinality of the natural numbers.
So we have a true antecedent and a false consequent; thus, the
inference is false.
This failure might predispose the reader to despair of the use-
fulness of this notion.10 Such despair would be premature. For,
remember, proponents of agent-relative conceivability usually rela-
tivize the inference to: “it is conceivable for a that φ” implies “it is
possible for φ that x.” That is, the antecedent is itself modified to
take on the meaning of, roughly, “it appears to a that possibly x.”
8This assumes the 6th grader has had some set theory; I myself did at about
that time, but I do not know whether or not that forms part of the standard
curriculum.
9Of course, the 6th grader will likely just take this to mean “all infinite sets
are the same size.” Since I have some reservations about the use of “size” in this
context, I will use the more technical and better-defined (in the infinite case) term
“cardinality.”
10George Bealer, for instance, writes: “The mere fact that I tried, but happened
to fail, to conceive that p is not a good guide to what is in principle possible in
this regard for any being whatsoever; maybe I am just no sharp enough...The
moral is simple: in the matter of evidence for possibility and impossibility, talk
of conceivability and inconceivabiltiy is an idle complication that only breeds
confusion.” See Bealer (2002), p. 76.
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So returning to our case of the 6th grader, since he does in fact find
it conceivable that all infinite sets are of the same size, I see no great
objection to concluding that “it appears to our 6th grader that it is
possible that all infinite sets are of the same size.” As a consequence
of this, we might think to modify our entailment to the following:
(4) Caφ→ ^aφ
where ^aφ is to be understood as standing for “it appears to a
that possibly φ.”
So far, so good. How do we handle the agent-invariant case? At
the outset we should note a crucial difference between these cases
which the terminology being used might have obscured. The agent-
relative rendering is primarily concerned with what a particular
agent may reasonably conclude is possible, based upon what he
determines is conceivable–thus, any possibility it might obtain is,
most likely, epistemic. The agent-invariant version, on the other
hand, could in principle be free from the sorts of pitfalls which led
us astray in the sense of the 6th grader. This version, whatever
its demerits, is precisely not intimately wedded to talking about
what this particular agent might find conceivable. Instead, if it is to
determine that something is conceivable, this will have to hold true
independently of the foibles of any particular agent or conceiver.
This gives it–at least, on the face of it–a much better shot at getting
to a thicker, more metaphysical notion of possibility from some
conceivability statement.
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One way we might achieve this sort of neutrality is to use Men-
zies’ conceit of the ideal conceiver. This pretty naturally requires us
to modify the previous entailment relation, which, recall, was
(5) Ja^φ→ ^aφ
The problem with this version–or rather what forced us to modify
the original–was the fact that we treated “a” as free, or at least
interchangeable. This in turn kept the entailment from being truth-
preserving, since what counts as conceivable will vary greatly from
person to person. Ideally, this version won’t suffer that problem.
The entire point of speaking of an ideal conceiver is precisely that it
should be free of these pitfalls. At a first approximation, we might
modify the above entailment to:
(6) JI^φ→ ^φ
where I is an ideal conceiver. The success of this scheme pretty
evidently depends on how we’re cashing out the notion of an ideal
conceiver. We might describe I as follows:
Definition 1. (Ideal Conceiver) A conceiver I is called ideal if:
(1) He possesses ideally excellent mental and cognitive capacities.
(Ideality)
(2) He possesses only true beliefs. (Doxastic soundness)
(3) He is capable of completing any rational or extrapolative process
from his basic belief set in a finite number of steps. (Finiteness)
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The need for (1) should be pretty clear–if we want an ideal con-
ceiver, certainly his mental and cognitive capacities should be as
finely tuned as one might desire. (2) is pretty obviously necessary
as well; as we saw in the case of the 6th grader, possession of false
beliefs can result in the entailment not holding. Though the en-
tailment would trivially hold in the case of the antecedent and the
consequent both being false, or vacuously hold in the case of the
consequent being true and the antecedent false, neither of these are
of any good epistemic or metaphysical use. For our purposes, these
cases are boring. The non-boring case, then, is the one in which
both antecedent and consequent are true. Additionally, since I’s an
ideal conceiver, he should ideally (pun intended) have access only
to good information. For our purposes, “good” should be taken to
mean “maximally accurate.”
It’s possible that (3) is not strictly necessary, but it seems like
a good stipulation nonetheless. In some situations, determining
whether or not a given proposition, state of affairs, or entity is in
fact conceivable (specifically, in the case where the conceivable is
identified as whatever is determinable a priori) would require I
to compare various elements of his basic epistemic set with the
concept in question to see whether any inconsistency arises. If such
a process never terminates, we reach an obvious difficulty: I will
never determine whether a given thing is conceivable, even though
it very well may be possible. Such a conceiver could hardly be called
“ideal”!
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To give an example (which will be somewhat misleading if taken
too literally): suppose that our ideal conceiver wants to determine
if there is a highest prime number. And suppose he elects to do
so simply by computing the prime factorization of every natural
number. This process will never terminate, since to determine the
conceivability of this proposition in this way would require a count-
ably infinite (at least) number of steps. In this case there is, of course,
a very simple way to arrive at the truth of whether the given propo-
sition is conceivable. And that would be to produce a proof of
Euclid’s theorem that is itself checkable in a finite number of steps.
The point which we are attempting to illustrate is that without some
restrictions, some processes of conceiving will never terminate, even
though the thing conceived of in fact has a definite modal status.
This motivates (3).
This will also place restraints on the person who holds that to
be conceivable is to be determinable a priori, in some sense–that is,
in order to determine whether or not something is conceivable, I
has to check its coherence with his basis belief set. Call the ideal
conceiver’s basis belief set B, and the set of all propositions com-
patible with the propositions expressed by the conceiver’s doxastic
attitudes CB. Then, if (3) is to be satisfied, CB must (accepting
the Church-Turing thesis) be at least recursively enumerable, since
otherwise there is no way to determine whether or not a given
proposition is a member of CB (which is another way of saying “is
compatible with every element of B”). As far as I can tell, this holds
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only for the versions of conceivability which require a priori coher-
ence (of which, more later). So it looks like we’ll have to Chisolm
away at (2) a bit, to something like the following:
Definition 2. (Doxastic soundness and semi-decidability)I pos-
sesses only true beliefs, and the set of all propositions consistent with those
beliefs is at least semi-decidable.
A potential objection to this definition suggests itself here. Given
some set of true beliefs Bi, there must must a corresponding set
of propositions consistent with it, CBi. If we want to be able to
determine what’s in CBi, however, it seems like CBi needs to be
at least semi-decidable. This implies that, if we were to speak of a
maximally complete set of true beliefs–that is, one which just contains
any and all true beliefs not involving personalized true beliefs (e.g.,
indexical ones: “That baby is mine”)–then the corresponding set CB
will have to be decidable. This is an odd consequence, since it seems
to give an upper limit–or at least a limiting principle–to how many
true beliefs there might be. Consequently, one might say, how many
things there are in heaven and earth would be determined by what
is dreamt of in our philosophies. Or, more minimally, if one has a
set of all true beliefs but not necessarily a maximally complete one,
there still couldn’t be any true propositions which don’t cohere with
them (that is, which contradict or are inconsistent with them). The
idea, then, is that this is a monumentally ambitious thesis, which
gives us reason to be hesitant in its acceptance. This is an interesting
objection, but not, I think, a very good one, because it amounts only
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to saying “you’re proposing rationalism!” That is as it may be. But
the entire notion of the identification of the conceivable with the a
priori was precisely a proposing of a modal rationalism, and one
can’t very well object to a philosophical thesis on the grounds that,
if it were true, it would be true.
Another way we might solve this problem is by stipulating that,
in addition to (1), our ideal conceiver has amongst his cognitive
apparatus something like a “black box.” That is, for a given com-
putation that cannot be carried out in a finite number of steps, the
ideal conceiver is able to determine, in a single or very small num-
ber of finite steps, its modal status. Methodologically, however,
this is a poor move, in part because it amounts to a fudge, but also
because part of this whole exercise is to determine whether or not
modal truths can be arrived at by human reasoners, even if they
be humans of exalted capability. Certainly, humans can intuit the
answers to some questions before they can arrive at a strict demon-
stration of it.11 But this seems unlikely to be the sort of thing that
could be thought to be in common to humans or reasoners as such,
and it certainly does not seem like the kind of thing which might be
thought of as a process of computation. So: no oracles.
This leads up naturally to our next point: in principle the ideal
conceiver should possess only maximally fine-tuned human capa-
bilities. If we’re interested in knowing whether our intuitions about
11A canonical example is the Riemann hypothesis. It is my sense that the
majority of complex analysts tend to think it’s true, and to date all of the poles of
ζ(s) which would qualify do in fact line up on Re{z} = 12 , but so far no proof has
been forthcoming.
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modality or our conceiving abilities entail modal truths–or even
the weaker proposition that they are a usually reliable guide to
modal truths–then we are not interested in what some non-human
conceiver–that is, a conceiver whose has a completely different set
of mental faculties than we do–might be able to tell us conceivabil-
ity, unless this ideal conceiver was able to arrive at the modal truths
he imparts to us in a manner which only made use of distinctively
human faculties and beliefs which humans could, under ideal cir-
cumstances, obtain. And at that point, there’s no need to posit a
non-human conceiver when simply an ideal human one will do.
So we arrive at the following amended definition:
Definition 3. (Ideal Conceiver, revised) A conceiver I is called
ideal iff
(1) He possesses ideally excellent mental and cognitive capacities.
(Ideality)
(2) He possesses only true beliefs. (Epistemic Soundness)
(3) He is capable of completing any rational or extrapolative process
from his basic belief set in a finite number of steps. (Finiteness)
(4) The set of all propositions consistent with his basic belief set is
semi-decidable. (Checkability)
So, with this in place, we can reduce our entailment relation to:
(7) JI^φ→ ^φ
where we’ve replaced the Jaφ with JI, to indicate “I judges
that...” etc. It might seem that this formulation of the non-epistemic
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version in fact makes it into an epistemic version yet again. And this
is not entirely inaccurate. But the chief drawback with the original
epistemic version was that it offered a good way to determine epis-
temic, but not metaphysical modality. And, while the agent-invariant
notion is dependent in some sense on the basic belief set of I–and is
consequently and in this case an epistemic formulation–the deter-
minations of I, as formulated, will, as intended, be truth-tracking
in the proper way.
At this point, having spelled out what our ideal conceiver would
look like, we could cash out the significance of this conceit in one
of three ways. First, it could be cashed out as what any agent
would be able to conceive of if he were “uplifted” and acquired
all the relevant characteristics of the ideal conceiver which he did
not already possess. Second, it could be cashed out in a more
a priori sense, with the ideal conceiver being a useful heuristic
that simply refers to what is computable or deducible under ideal
circumstances, without any particular commitment to whether or
not the ideal conceiver actually exists. Third, one could avoid the
“uplift” method, but still think that the talk of “ideal conceiving” is
not a mere useful fiction.
The first method is for all intents and purposes a way to move
from the agent-relative case to the agent-invariant case. Consider
again our intrepid 6th grader. He was not able to conceive of there
being different sizes of infinity, and consequently our conditional
^aφ → ^φ failed, since it had a true antecedent and a false conse-
quent. But most 6th graders grow up. At one time I had no notion
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of different sizes of infinity, and now I do. I can think back, and say
something like the following: had I known then what I knew know,
I would have been able to conceive of different large cardinals in
the appropriate way. We engage–or at any rate I engage–in this
pattern of reasoning all the time, whether with regard to important
matters (“had he known of the 2008 housing bubble, he would not
have invested in real estate”) or with regard to trivial ones (“had
I known that she intended to use the Shepherd’s Check, I would
have moved my pawn differently”), and we take ourselves not to
be talking nonsense in these cases.
Motivated by this, we can try and cast the inference relation
informally as the following:
Definition 4. (Ideal Conceiver Entailment) For an agent a and an
entity φ, if a were to possess 1-4 and could conceive of φ, then possibly
φ.12
I refrain from setting this out formally because I think the struc-
ture of general RR would remain more or less unchanged from the
general agent-invariant case. The only difference in this case is that
we are seeking out what particular interpretation we want to give
to the content of the inference.
The reader might notice that, though the agent in question is
being “uplifted,” his base belief set remains unchanged. More to
the point, while the agent’s base belief set might conceivably (no pun
12Sidenote: one alternate, formalized version of this sort of implication which
I think worth exploring is CIφ φ. Since this would take us into accounts of
modal knowledge grounded in counterfactuals–and we’ve bracketed those out
for the sake of discussion–we will stick to the simple material conditional.
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intended) be pared down a bit–since most agents we would care to
work with will have some false beliefs–it will not be expanded.
This should be unsurprising, since the process is, so to speak, one
of refinement rather than total expansion. This has the potential
to render the account somewhat agent-relative, absent some other
constraint placed on the uplift process.
Were we to endorse the second method, we would be committed
to removing the conceiver from the picture entirely. Or, at the
very least, we would be adopting the view that such an agent is
not an indispensable (or perhaps even unnecessary) part of our
system. Since some of the properties of our ideal conceiver do in fact
make reference to agent-specific properties (“excellent cognitive and
mental faculties”), we would have to adopt some sort of revisionist
attitude towards it. Let’s say, for instance, that we think that 1)-
4) represent (implicitly, admittedly) a sort of multiply realizable
process rather than the entity in which the process is realized. We
might then want to rephrase 1) to something like the following:
Definition 5. (Ideality, revised) The I-process contains no faulty
or non-truth preserving computational or comparative mechanisms or
algorithms.
(2)-(4) work pretty much equally well in either case, since up to
relabeling they don’t require any consequential changes.
This process seems to make an interesting concession. Recall
that we are, at bottom, interested in precisely how our armchair
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speculations about modality might be a good guide to true meta-
physical modality. As a result, if we’re to spell out this “ideal
conceiver” in terms of an abstract, multiply-realizable process or
entity, then it will have to be one which could in principle be car-
ried out by a human agent. Otherwise, this would be an interesting
but academic exercise about what could, in principle, count as a
good account of conceivability. And while such an exercise is in
itself quite interesting–of philosophical value, even–that’s not what
we’re presently aimed at. Consequently, the computational or com-
parative mechanisms or algorithms made use of in this process have
to be ones which a given agent presently possesses and/or employs,
however imperfectly.13
2. Empiricist vs. Rationalist
It should be noted that the ways in which we parsed out con-
ceivability at first are not properly symmetric. The agent-invariant
and agent-relative senses are in a sense a first-order thesis about
conceivability–they involve, primarily, who does the conceiving.
On the other hand, there are a variety of independent, second-order
theses about what conceivability is. The ones we will examine in a
moment are primarily concerned not with the agent doing the con-
ceiving, but rather with what precisely the “a judges φ” clause in
our formulation of RR involves. The divide between the empiricist
and rationalist account, naturally, turns on what conceiving entails.
13There is another assumption at work here: conceivability, in the sense given
above, is either computational or algorithmic in nature (or at least arbitrarily well-
modeled in those ways). The implication of this view are potentially interesting,
but I will not examine them here.
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Roughly speaking, the empiricist account holds that conceivabil-
ity is (at least primarily) a phenomenal act, involving sensory or
quasi-sensory capacities and activities. The rationalist account, on
the other hand, does not (necessarily) involve any sort of sensory
element, but rather is concerned with determining coherence, or
lack of contradiction.
2.1. The empiricist account. The seeds of the empiricist posi-
tion go at the very least back to the Thomas Reid. He writes:
Conceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, are
what the schoolmen called immanent acts of the
mind, which produce nothing beyond themselves...That
this is the common sense of me who are untutored
by philosophy appears in their language. If one ig-
norant of the language should ask, What is meant
by conceiving a thing? we should very naturally
answer that it is having an image of it in the mind–
and perhaps we could not explain the word better.
This shows that conception, and the image of the
thing in the mind, are synonymous expressions.
The image int he mind, therefore, is not the object
of conception, nor is it any effect produced by con-
ception as a cause. It is conception itself. That very
mode of thinking which we call conception is by
another name called an image in the mind14
In some current debates, this account of conceivability has gained
some currency. For instance, Yablo writes:
I find p conceivable if I can imagine, not a situ-
ation in which I truly believe that p, but one of
which I truly believe that p[...]Imagining can either
14Reid (1941), Essay IV, Chapter 1, §3 (p. 233).
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be propositional–imagining that there is a tiger be-
hind the curtain–or objectual– imagining the tiger
itself.15
This he calls “philosophical conceivability.” In a similar vein, Jenk-
ins (2010) writes that
[I]n at least some cases, the senses may ground
modal knowledge by providing what I call epis-
temic grounding for our concepts, which concepts
(help to) determine what we can and cannot con-
ceive of, which in turn guides our modal beliefs.
And[...]the fact that our concepts are grounded in
this way is what accounts for the fact that conceiv-
ability — which I take to be a matter of what our
concepts will allow us to conceive of — can be a
guide to independent modal truth.16
Jenkins takes it that we can conceive of something if our concepts
allow us to coherently represent a given entity (or state of affairs,
or...). There’s a sort of two-level requirement going on. On one
level resides the act of representing a given x–that is, “picturing”
the given x in Reid’s sense. On another, our concepts, determined
by our senses, which ground our powers of representation.
Following Yablo, we can offer a rough first definition:
Definition 6. (ConceivabilityE) X can conceive of P iff X can imag-
ine a situation of which X believes truly that P.
Yablo is entirely correct that there are multiple senses under
which we might understand “X can imagine.” First, we can con-
sider what he calls propositional imagining. A chief differentiating
15Yablo (1993), p. 26.
16Jenkins (2010), p. 255.
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feature is that this sense of imagining is not so much a phenome-
nal representation as it is a certain kind of propositional attitude.
For instance, say that I have a mental state whose content can be
expressed by “there is a 100 pound trout on the floor of the Mil-
ton S Eisenhower Library.” Sticking to the “propositional” case,
the mental state would be (something like) having a propositional
attitude–a belief, say–the content of which is accurately described
by the English sentence “there is a 100 lb. trout on the floor of the
Milton S Eisenhower library.”
We can attempt to collect this into a more concise definition:
Definition 7. (Propositional Imagining) A imaginesP P iff A has
a propositional attitude whose content yields an accurate description (in
some language) of P.
Next is the “objectual imagining.” In Yablo’s case, this is to
imagine the tiger itself. In our case, it would be imagining the
giant trout itself, flopping about in the floor of the library. This sort
of imagining involves, at least in some ways, a sensory or quasi-
sensory presentation of the entity or state of affairs in question. This
is a bit closer to the sense of “imagine” we (or at any rate I) tend
to use in everyday conversation. It is also, note, approximately the
one Reid offered above. Taking our cue from him, we can attempt a
first-approximation at a definition:
Definition 8. (Objectual imagining) A objectually imagines (or
“imaginesO”) P iff A has some sensory or quasi-sensory mental represen-
tation (or suitable analog of a mental representation) of P.
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Yablo notes–rightly–that in some cases imaginingO and imaginingP
come hand in hand. There is also a question of the level of specificity
which accompanies imaginingO:
To imagine an object as determinate is to imagine it
as possessing the higher-order property stated, that
of possessing a determinate property for each of its
determinables. There is a world of difference, then,
between imagining an object as determinate-as pos-
sessing determinates for each of its determinables-
and determinately imagining it-specifying in each
case what the underlying determinate is. What I
have been urging is that objectual imagining is de-
terminate in the first sense but not the second[...]What
we are tempted to describe as imagining a more
or less determinate situation, is better described as
imagining a fully determinate situation whose de-
terminate properties are left more or less unspeci-
fied.17
Given the degree of vagueness this seems to suggest, one wonders
whether Yablo’s account does the lifting he wants it to do. We can
stipulate that these entities or states of affairs have some unspecified
yet determinate properties or aspects, but this seems to give us only
a partial guide to whether or not the complete thing in question is
metaphysically possible.18 And this is a major desideratum of our
17Yablo (1993), p. 28.
18This essentially is the worry expressed in van Inwagen (1998): “Although it
is in a sense trivial that to assert the possibility of P is to commit oneself to the
possibility of a whole, coherent reality of which the truth of p is an integral part,
examination of the attempts of philosophers to justify their modal convictions
show that this triviality is rarely if ever an operative factor in these attempts. A
philosopher will confidently say that a (naturally) purple cow is possible, but he
or she will not in fact have devoted any thought to the question of whether there
is a chemically possible purple pigment such that thee coding for the structures
that would be responsible for its production and its proper placement in a cow’s
coat could be coherently inserted into any DNA that was really cow DNA – or
even “cow-like-thing-but-for-color” DNA.” (p. 78).
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current project. At this stage, it’s hard to see how he might have
a principled response to an objection such as the following: “these
situations we’re supposed to imagine may in fact have some deep-
seated yet non-obvious flaw. Your account leaves certain amounts
of vagueness in the description; but who knows, a priori, what
filling in those dots would reveal? And if we could determine such
details beforehand, why the vagueness in the first place?”19
One response to this sort of objection would be to say that the
relevant respect of “imaginable” has been passed, and that that’s
all that matters. Take the example of the trout. I imagineO the
trout, flopping about on the floor of MSE. To be sure, I’m not having
a mental representation of every aspect of the trout. I am not,
for instance, imagining either a lake trout or a rainbow trout. Or
perhaps I’m not really attentive to the differences between a 101
lb. trout and a 99 lb. trout. But certainly I’m imaginingO the trout
as possessing some determinate properties–scales, for instance–and
in that sense I can indeed conceive of the trout. If RR turns out
to work, then one might simply start at the general conception of
the trout. The first step would to be determine if any generic and
specified properties of the trout are imaginableO. Should they prove
to be imaginableO, then the imaginer can go further incrementally,
testing each of the hypothetical, unspecified properties to see if they
are imaginableO.
19This is distinct from the problem of vague predicates. In typical cases of
vagueness, the problem is that the predicates in question do not admit of specifica-
tion. In our case, the problem is that the predicates may not have boundary cases,
but are under-specified, leaving some degree of cognitive wiggle room.
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In this respect, at least, imaginabilityP enjoys a clear advantage
over imaginabilityO. While the details of a sensory or quasi-sensory
mental attitude can be hard to determine or specify in all relevant
respects, it is less hard to have a propositional attitude which is
specified in as much detail as one might like. Consider again the
case of the trout. Were we to use the imagineP sense instead of the
imagineO sense, it would be fairly easy to simply include the other
relevant properties, or at least a suitable and relatively determinate
elliptical. The description could be something like “there is a 100
lb. trout, of ordinary features for its species, on the floor of the MSE
Library,” or however more specific one would care to make it.
There is at another way in which imaginationP enjoys an ad-
vantage over imaginationO. Were some person A able to imagineO
some P, it would be somewhat difficult to accurately (or at least
fairly accurately) capture all relevant details of the imagined P so
that A could use this imaginability as evidence of P’s possibility to
person B. For instance, suppose I am trying to explain to a friend of
mine who has never read The Lord of the Rings the appearance and
general features of the hobbits. I might say that they have hairy
feet, rosy cheeks, plump bellies, and soft hands. I might be able
to give a very accurate description of my picture of a hobbit, but
this is no guarantee that, upon my description, my friend will have
the same picture of what a hobbit looks like that I do in the quasi-
sensory sense.20 But if we’re interested in imaginingP, in this case,
20A very vivid example of this can be seen if one compares the old animated
Bankin-Rass portrayal of hobbits with those given in Peter Jackson’s live-action
trilogy.
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this should be good enough. If I describe to him my imageP of a
hobbit, it’s unlikely he will get a relevantly (if at all) different imageP
of a hobbit. One seems to stand a much better chance of giving a
justification of one’s beliefs about conceivability, then, if one uses
imaginabilityP.
2.2. The rationalist account. In contrast to the account pre-
sented in the previous paragraphs, the rationalist account is less
interested in the ways the agent might employ his imagination. In-
stead, if a rationalist modal epistemology cares at all about conceiv-
ability, the kind it wishes to examine will involve the examination
of a particular proposition or expression, possibly in conjunction
with one or more other propositions or expressions, with an eye to
determining their (nomological, metaphysical) compatibility. Addi-
tionally, where the empiricist account is, at least on some picture, in
principle concerned with some sensory or quasi-sensory activities
(for instance, imaginingO), the rationalist account is primarily con-
cerned with what can be discovered a priori. Pretty naturally, then,
any sensory or quasi-sensory component is of tangential concern,
at best. What matters in this case is the correct application concepts
or principles which are (in some sense) a priori.
One shouldn’t get the impression that rationalist accounts of
modal knowledge are totally homogeneous. For instance, Peacocke
(1999) argues that correctly understanding modal logic–and con-
sequently achieving modal knowledge–involves the correct appli-
cation of what he calls the “Principles of Possibility.” Under this
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account, “a specification represents a genuine possibility only if it
respects these principles.”21 He continues:
My claim is that someone who understands modal
discourse has a form of implicit knowledge of the
Principles of Possibility. It is this implicit knowl-
edge that allows him to discriminate between those
ways which are ways the world might be, and those
ways or specifications which are not. More gener-
ally, someone who understands modal discourse
applies this knowledge of the Principles of Possi-
bility in evaluating modal claims.22
Chalmers (2002), on the other hand, offers a broadly rationalist
account which fits nicely into our current discussion:
Negative notions of conceivability hold that S is con-
ceivable when S is not ruled out. For example,
a sense of “conceivable” in common usage holds
roughly that S is conceivable when it is not ruled
out by what one knows, or by what one believes
[...]The central sort of negative conceivability holds
that S is negatively conceivable when S is not ruled
out a priori, or when there is no (apparent) contra-
diction in S[...]We can say that S is prima facie neg-
atively conceivable for a subject when that subject,
after consideration, cannot rule out S on a priori
grounds. And we can say that S is ideally nega-
tively conceivable when it is not a priori that ∼S.23
The chief takeaway is that there is some variety of opinion about
just what the rationalistic project in modal epistemology should
entail. As we’re concerned with views which think conceiving of
21Peacocke (1998), p. 125.
22ibid., 125–126.
23Chalmers (2002), p. 159. Emphasis mine. This is only one amongst many
notions of conceivability that Chalmers discusses; indeed, positive conceivability
is a sort of empiricist account, and the negative/positive connection is discussed
at length.
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something is in some way constitutive of knowing that it is possible,
we’ll only be examining Chalmers’ view here.24
The description of ideal negative conceivability seems pretty
appropriate for our current discussion. We might collect this notion
into the following definition:
Definition 9. (Negative conceivability) A can conceiven of P iff A
cannot rule out P on a priori grounds.
Here a priori grounds means what it typically does–grounds
which make no reference to methods or concepts exclusively reliant
on sense data.
Here, as before, we run into the question of subjectivity. The
description makes reference to whether or not P is conceivable for a
particular subject if such-and-so constraints hold and certain condi-
tions are met. This may give us a good idea of whether any particular
judgment is true. What it does not do is furnish us with a general
principle–and that’s the project of this section. Furthermore, we
run into the problem of whether or not the agent of question is ca-
pable of understanding the implications of all (true) beliefs he has,
or whether he’ll be able to effectively carry out such a process of
comparison or inspection.
This suggests a natural formulation of the strong version of NC,
along the same lines that we did previously with the ‘ideal con-
ceiver”.
24Arguably, we could try and coax a conceivability principle from Peacocke’s
view. But that would be eisegetical, so we won’t do that.
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Definition 10. (Ideal Negative Conceivability) P is ideally neg-
atively conceivable (or “conceivablein) iff I cannot rule out P on a priori
grounds.
The question of what precisely comprises the ideal conceiver’s
basis set of beliefs is still relevant. One might think that the precise
content–or more correctly, the size–of the belief set doesn’t matter
very much. After all, the relevant question is compatibility, not
inferential strength (that is, the number of true beliefs the agent
can acquire by examining his priori commitments). I think this
is a mistake. Take, again, our hypothetical 6th grader. Suppose
that we endow him with a belief set containing all theorems of
number theory, set theory, model theory, algebra, and the rest of
mathematics, couples with knowledge of all proof strategies and
rules of inference. Even so equipped, our hypothetical 6th grader
will not be able to rule out, on a priori grounds, that the nominative
plural case of the first declension Latin noun nauta is nautarum (in
fact, it is naute).25
Granted, this is not an instance of making an incorrect modal
judgment, but rather an incorrect judgment about Latin grammar
rigidified to the world which the 6th grader inhabits. But the
claim was that conceivabilityin will render certain things conceiv-
able which are not, in fact, true, provided that the ideal conceiver is
only equipped with a non-maximal basis set of beliefs. Consider a
modally stronger example. If we extend our 6th grader’s knowledge
25Operating under the assumption, of course, that our 6th grader is not well-
versed in Latin; if he were, the case would be trivial, but we could move over to
Attic Greek and be in an equally good case.
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base to some physics–say, physics up until the year 1895–he will
probably have at least one modally false belief: a universe can exist
which obeys Maxwell’s equations under Galilean transformations,
rather than Lorentz transformations, in having a maximum possi-
ble velocity of c.26 Because the theory of lumeniferous aether was
demonstrated to be incorrect empirically by the Michelson-Morley
experiment (and empirical experimentation is the paradigm case of
an a posteriori procedure), it is unlikely that only an a priori analysis
of the pre-existing body of physical knowledge is enough to render
it false.
The upshot of this is the following: the basic belief set of I is
going to have to be expanded. in particular, it will have to be ex-
panded to a sufficient level where no false beliefs will be coherent
with it.27 That there even could be such a basis is a controversial
position, since accepting this position comes very close to accepting
a fully rationalistic account of knowledge. For the moment, we will
assume that such a thesis is true. If the reader finds this assump-
tion problematical, then he can follow our discussion in a spirit of
thought-experiment: if these assumptions and theses are true, then
such-and-so results follow.
26Giving a full explanation of this point would take us too far afield. If the
reader wishes to read a full exposition of the argument, he may find them in a
standard textbook on special relativity, say Resnick (1968, pp. 16-18).
27One might want to add a “compactness” condition, and say that no false
beliefs will be coherent with any subset of his basic belief set. We won’t explore
this possibility here.
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Again following Chalmers (who in turn follows the Aufbau), we
can cash out the desired basis belief set in a way similar to what he
calls a scrutability base:
A scrutability base is a class of truths from which all
truths are scrutable, for a given notion of scrutabil-
ity[. . . ]How small can a scrutability base be? Let
us say that a minimal scrutability base is a class of
sentences C such that C is a scrutability base and
no proper subclass of C is a scrutability base.28
Scrutability, generally speaking, is the thesis that, given a certain
class of truths, one can discover–through inference or some other
process–all other truths of the world.29 In our case, as well, this
process of discovery is purely a priori. What precisely that class of
truths happens to be is our current concern. The above description
is somewhat more extravagant than what we need for the present
purposes. At the moment, we are concerned with what sorts of true
beliefs one would need in order to determine truths about what
is possible. For instance, it seems logically possible that the fine
structure constant should have a value of (approximately) 1136 rather
than (approximately ) 1137 , but the class of truths from which it is
conceivablein that such a state of affairs is possible differs substan-
tially from the class of truths from which it is conceivablein that
state of affairs is actual–especially since the value of the fine struc-
ture constant in the actual world is in fact (approximately ) 1137 .
30
28Chalmers (2012), pp. 38–39.
29Chalmers has (at least) 4 different types of scrutability: inferential, condi-
tional, a priori, and generalised. For more detail, see the Introduction and §2.2-2.6
of Chalmers (2012).





Consequently, we might be well off in adding another detail to
our previous description of the ideal conceiver:
Definition 11. (Epistemic Soundness and Maximality) I pos-
sesses a relevantly maximal set of true beliefs.
The notion of a relevantly maximal set of true beliefs is similar to
that of a scrutability base. We can try to give it a more precise defi-
nition: let S be a scrutability base from which all categories of truths
(microphysical, modal, logical, and so on) are scrutable. Then a rel-
evantly maximal scrutability base is a subclass M ⊂ S from which
all truths of a given category are scrutable. If the scrutability base is
a minimal scrutability base, then M is unique.31 A relevantly max-
imal set of true beliefs, then, is a set of beliefs whose propositional
content corresponds to the members of M.
3. Recap
A brief refresher on the main points of this chapter is in order.
(1) If we want to use RR to establish more solid, credible re-
sults on modality, it is best to construct it as an entailment
relation–conceivability entails metaphysical possibility–rather
than just a reliability relation–conceivability offers a better-
than-not guide to metaphysical possibility. We can render
this entailment as Caφ → ^φ, where Caφ =d f Ja^φ, or in
English, “φ is conceivable if a judges φ to be possible,” for
a suitable notion of “judges.”
31This may need to be proven a little further, but it has a certain degree of
prima facie appeal.
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(2) If we want to have the strong version of RR, then it is best to
construe the conceivability part of the entailment in terms
of an ideal conceiver. This ideal conceiver plausibly has the
following characteristics:
(a) He possesses ideal mental and cognitive capacities.
(Ideality)
(b) He possesses a relevantly maximal set of true beliefs.
(Epistemic Soundness and Maximality)
(c) He is capable of completing any rational or extrapola-
tive process from his basic belief set in a finite number
of steps. (Finiteness)
(d) The set of all propositions consistent with his basic
belief set is semi-decidable. (Checkability)
(3) There are roughly two categories into which accounts of
conceivability can fall.
(a) Empiricist. These accounts of conceivability typically
hold that conceivability involves some sort of men-
tal exercise which has essential sensory or quasi-sensory
qualities. This imagination can be either propositional–
to use Yablo’s example, imagining that there is a tiger
behind the curtain–or objectual–following Yablo again,
imagining the tiger itself.
(b) Rationalist. These accounts of conceivability typically
do not require that conceivability have any essential
sensory or quasi-sensory qualities. Instead, these ac-
counts tend to revolve around an agent examining
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some proposition to see whether it passes certain sorts




Antomies of Pure Conception
The second class of sophistical arguments is occupied with
the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the se-
ries of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from
the fact that I have always a self-contradictory conception of the
unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the
truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no con-
ception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments,
I shall term the antinomy of pure reason.
– Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 340/B 398
In the previous chapter, we examined various forms of the
conceivability–to–possibility arguments, for differing values of “con-
ceivable.” It’s possible, however, to make the argument stronger, ei-
ther by identifying possibility with conceivability, or else to add to RR
the converse–that is,^φ→ Cφ again for the specified value of “con-
ceivable.” We can call–and will henceforth call–theses of this kind
“modal monism,”–following Vaidya (2008)–since they hold (with
some qualification) that the space of metaphysically possible worlds
and epistemically possible worlds are coextensive. Additionally, we
will mean by “modal monism” the purely conceivability-based ver-
sion.
The argument of this chapter is, in short, that modal monism is
false, or at least that multiple versions of it are false and others are
quite debatable. The converse of RR leads us to conclude that certain
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things, which we have decent independent reasons for thinking
possible, are in fact inconceivable and therefore impossible. The
problem, it appears to me, is that if we identify the possible with
the conceivable–which is an important part of this version of modal
monism–then the two must have the same range–that is, everything
which is possible is also conceivable, and contrariwise. As will
be argued in this chapter, this is an implausible–or at least quite
fraught–proposition.
The first order of business, then, is to get a good hold on the
different types of monism. This is the topic of the first section.
0. Modal monism
Building on the work of Chapter 1, we might construct our
desired version of monism by adding an another clause to RR.
There are two broad ways we could construe this clause. These
are, roughly speaking:
(1) The implication thesis: ^φ→ Cφ
(2) The identification thesis: ^φ ≡ Cφ
0.1. Expansions of (1). Does possibility entail conceivability?
At first blush, one hard pressed to know how to answer. There are
at least two reasons for this. First, it’s not precisely clear just what
sense of possibility we are concerned with: do we care whether a
given thing is logically possible? Metaphysically possible? Second,
it’s likewise not clear what notion of conceivability we are concerned
with. As a result, it’s difficult to know whether a blanket answer to
that question is possible. We will consider both points in turn.
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First, what notion of possibility are we interested in? Broadly,
there are three: logical, metaphysical, and nomic. Logical possibility
consists in not implying a contradiction or being logically inconsis-
tent. Metaphysical possibility, while perhaps a little less expansive
than logical possibility, is still quite broad. In order to be meta-
physically possible, an entity must not only not contain (or imply)
any logical contradiction, but must also conform to any broad meta-
physical principles which may hold across all worlds. For instance,
some essentialists hold that a given property P of a substance S is
an essential property if there is no situation in which S exists where
P is not exemplified. Consequently, it is metaphysically–though
not necessarily logically, depending on the analysis one wishes to
conduct–impossible for there to be an instantiation of S without a
concurrent instantiation of P. Finally, we have nomic possibilities,
which correspond to those varieties of modality connected with laws
of nature. To turn to an earlier example, it would be a question of
nomic possibility whether or not there could be a universe which is
accurately described by Maxwell’s equations under Galilean trans-
formations. Similarly, whether there could be a universe which is
totally accurately described by both modified Newtonian dynamics
and physical theories involving dark matter would be a question of
nomic possibility.
In principle, it would be possible to construct a version of (1) for
any of these three. For the time being, we will concern ourselves
with logical possibility. To a first approximation, we can say the
following:
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(1) If P is logically possible, then P is conceivable.
If we combine this question with the different kinds of conceivabil-
ity discussed so far we arrive at:
(1.1) If P is logically possible, then P is conceivableO.
(1.2) If P is logically possible, then P is conceivableP.
(1.3) If P is logically possible, then P is conceivablein.
Note that the more natural choice for this would be (1.3) (or possi-
bly (1.2)), since all it involves is contradiction detection. Determin-
ing broadly logical consistency from some sensory or quasi-sensory
mental representation seems, failing some immediate failure (along
the lines of a square circle or a sphere both red and green all over),
a difficult task.
0.2. Expansions of (2). (2), in its strongest form, identifies the
possible with the conceivable. How ought we construe “conceiv-
able” here? Following the categorizations in the previous chap-
ter, we have roughly three options: we construe it as an at of
imaginationO, an act of imaginationP, or as an act of conceivingin. We
will take the possibility in question to be logical possibility, as in the
previous section. This would leave us with the following principles:
(2.1) The possible is the conceivableO.
(2.2) The possible is the conceivableP
(2.3) The possible is the inconceivablein.
Suppose we think that the possible is to be identified with the
conceivableO. The relevant principle would then be (2.1). The fact
50
that a tiger with 79 black stripes and a lame left leg is possible, say,
is then the same as the fact that a tiger with 79 black stripes and a
lame left leg is conceivableO. But just who is doing the imaginingO?
The natural choice is our ideal conceiver, I.
There’s an immediate question regarding considerations of tem-
porality. For a significant period of time, there were no human
minds in the universe–the better part of the life of the universe, in
fact. One might suppose that there are other minds in the universe
besides humans, or at least that there were such minds for some
period of time. In any event, there was very plausibly a time where
there existed no conscious minds of the kind we are familiar with
at any place in the universe. If we identify the possible with the
conceivableO, and this last makes reference to the idea of an ideal
conceiver as something other than a mere heuristic, we might think
that, prior to the advent of conscious minds of a type sufficiently
similar to the ideal conceiver, there were no entities, states of affairs,
or propositions that we might call “possible.” And a position which
holds that the existence of such conscious entities at one time or
another might retroactively determine possibilities in the early uni-
verse, or in some other, non-actual world is–to put it charitably–a
strange one.
The question of specificity, discussed earlier, is relevant to the
current question. Recall: imaginabilityO was not in a good position
to make a judgment concerning matters of specific, fine-grained
properties of the imagines state of affairs. Consequently, should we
identify possibility with this kind of conceivability, conceivingO of
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such a situation might not eliminate the possibility of some unan-
alyzed contradictory or inconsistent property or concept. Just how
much specificity would be required is unclear. But this is essentially
a procedural worry, not a substantive one. Since our concern is with
the connection between the possible and the conceivable, we won’t
pay too much attention to this worry.
If we identify the possible with the conceivableP, the relevant
principle would be (2.2). This version enjoys the same advantage
over (2.1) that conceivabilityP does over conceivabilityO. Since the
ideal conceiver would be imagining, in some sense, a propositional
description of the 100 lb. trout (say), specificity would be a non-
issue. A constructive procedure for this activity might run as fol-
lows. One starts with the regular conceptionP of a trout of the
relevant kind. One then specifies the exact changes one would have
to make to the original conception in order to get at the desired possi-
bilium, all the while ensuring that the changes made do not produce
any conceptual inconsistencies. The procedure would be similar
for any potential possibilium, though the degree of complexity vary
substantially.
1. Against modal monism
Up until now no argument against modal monism has been of-
fered. That endeavor is the task of this section. First, we will discuss
some pre-existing arguments in the literature against certain direc-
tions of the argument. Subsequently, we will present additional
arguments for this position.
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1.1. A posteriori necessities. One class of counterexamples are
based on so-called a posteriori necessities. The usual examples in-
volve some conceptual truth that is supposed to be discovered a
posteriori, such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” and “water is H2O.”
These sorts of arguments can be schematised as follows:
(1) S is possible iff S is conceivable
(2) P is necessary and a posteriori
(3) Σ is a situation in which it is the case that ¬P
(4) Σ is conceivable
(5) Σ is possible
(6) ¬P is possible
(7) P is not necessary
(8) ⊥
∴ It is not the case that S is possible iff S is conceivable
For instance, it is commonly held that it is a conceptual necessity
that water is H2O. Yet it is also sometimes accepted that we can
conceive of scenarios which would falsify one’s belief of water’s
being H2O. In a famous example due to Putnam (1975), we are asked
to imagine a “Twin Earth.” The inhabitants of this Twin Earth refer
to a certain chemical compound as water. It does everything water
does. But it’s chemical formula is not H2O, but rather “XYZ.” We
can, or so the claim goes, “conceive” of this situation a priori. But
it is in fact an impossibility that water should fail to be H2O, we
conclude that conceivability is no good guide to possibility–or so at
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least the argument goes. This argument targets RR specifically; it
leaves unattended whether possibility entails conceivability.
Further, this is a counterexample directed against a particular
version of conceivability, one in which the agent in question con-
ceives of a situation which he takes to verify a certain proposition.
This differs slightly from some of the applicable versions of con-
ceivability which we entertained above (concevabilityO). In this
situation, the Twin Earth example is a scenario which is possible
for all you know, an which is taken to falsify some proposition P.
ConceivabilityO, on the other hand, invites the agent to actively
imagine the scenario in question. Yablo puts it this way:
p is conceivablei jb iff one can imagine justifiable be-
lieving that p[...]What I have been calling philosoph-
ical conceivability is none of these.1
What he calls philosophical conceivability divides up into conceivabilityP
and –O.
What are we to make of the counterexample in light of the dis-
tinction? Perhaps imaginingO that water is not H2O will involve
some sort of contradiction in concepts, and thus won’t leave itself
open to this counterexample.2 By happy consequence, one might
maintain, when one attempts to imagineP the given scenario by
starting from the simple case–something being water or something
being H2O–one simply cannot arrive at the desired counterexample.
1Yablo (1993), p. 26. Emphasis mine.
2Note that conceivabilityP leaves itself open to as much propositional depth
and specificity as one happens to need at the moment.
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Similarly, Chalmers argues that such counterexamples do not
count against his notion of conceivability (quite close to what we
have denoted conceivabilityip):
The other standard source of gaps between conceiv-
ability and possibility arises from Kripkean cases.
It is often said that it is conceivable that Hesperus
is not Phosphorus, or that water is not H2O, or that
heat is not the motion of molecules, but none of
these states of affairs is in fact possible. In these
cases we have a posteriori necessities and impossi-
bilities, out of the reach of a priori methods.
There are a couple of things to be said here.
Clearly, the main sense in which these states of
affairs are conceivable involves primary conceiv-
ability. As discussed earlier, the states of affairs in
question are not secondarily conceivable. At best,
they might be prima facie secondarily conceivable
for a subject lacking relevant empirical knowledge.
They will not be prima facie secondarily conceiv-
able for a subject with the relevant knowledge, and
they will not be ideally secondarily conceivable as
that notion is spelled out above.3
Here he employs his distinction between primary and secondary
conceivability made a section earlier:
We can say that S is primarily conceivable (or epis-
temically conceivable) when it is conceivable that S
is actually the case. We can say that S is secondarily
conceivable (or subjunctively conceivable) when S con-
ceivably might have been the case. This corresponds
to two different ways of thinking about hypothet-
ical possibilities: epistemically, as ways the world
might actually be, and subjunctively, as counterfac-




Making use of this distinction, one can argue that the state of af-
fairs corresponding to the description “H2O is not water” is not
secondarily conceivablein. On a priori grounds, an ideal conceiver
as defined in the previous chapter would be able to rule out since
this is a conceptual inconsistency, akin to the description “humans
are not mammals.”
Another doubt one might have is something like the following:
the notion of conceivability expressed by secondary conceivabilityin
is by nature a priori; the possibility or impossibility of these sorts of
counterexamples is itself a posteriori, and thus not determinable on
grounds independent of experience. Consequently, the possibility
or impossibility of these cases cannot be determined on solely a
priori grounds.
This is partially correct and partially mistaken. Certainly, the
modal status of such counterexamples is determined–or at any rate
was determined–by a posteriori means. But this is only a problem
if the base belief set of our ideal conceiver is filled only with those
truths whose factive status may be determined a priori, and there
seems no reason to suppose that this is the case.
In this sense, the methods of discovery or deduction are quite close
to being a priori, but the data from which the methods proceed may
be discovered or acquired through whichever means happens to be
available. Since the ideal conceiver’s belief base will be maximally
complete, one might expect that his concepts of “water” and “H2O”
will themselves be maximally complete (in the sense of maximally
well-specified). As a consequence, he would be able to rule out
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using only a priori methods the possibility of a scenario which is
accurately describes by “water is not H2O.” This, in turn, is what is
required to determine whether or not the given scenario is conceiv-
able. Since he can rule it out a priori, he (and we) might conclude
that it is not.
Certainly, this is a somewhat modified notion of the a priori (call
it “a priori +”). But I take it to be relevantly similar to the classic
notion in the following way: while the concepts which I is employ-
ing may in principle be supplied by the senses, all the conclusions
reached are reached by means of conceptual analysis and compari-
son, both of which are paradigmatic aprioristic endeavors. The fact
that gold has atomic number 79 is a truth which is determined em-
pirically (that is, a posteriori). But it is no less a conceptual truth for
all this. As a result, in idealized circumstances, a reasoner in pos-
session of the complete concept of “gold” will (or so is the claim)
be able to determine the truth of the statement “gold has atomic
number 79”.
We can also consider the converse, ^φ → Cax. Clearly, P is not
possible, as it is necessarily true. It would be a mistake, however,
to infer from this that P is not conceivable; this would be to affirm
the antecedent. Consequently, somebody who accepted (1) but not
RR could maintain that these sorts of counterexamples are in fact
conceivable though not possible and not incur any inconsistency in
his ideology.
So while the a posteriori counterexamples do in fact apply to
certain types of conceivability, the ones which we have articulated
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in this section are immune from them. We now turn to other classes
of counterexamples.
2. Inconceivable!
For the sake of completeness, we’ll lay out the following–weak–
version of this hypothesis:
Definition 12. (¬1) If P is inconceivable for some ideal conceiver I,
then P is impossible.
Again, this can be cashed out in terms of the different sorts of
conceivability discussed until this point:
(¬1.1) If P is inconceivableO for some ideal conceiver I, then P
is impossible.
(¬1.2) If P is inconceivableP for some ideal conceiver I, then P is
impossible.
(¬1.3) If P is inconceivablein for some ideal conceiver I, then P
is impossible.
We will take each in turn.
2.1. Does InconceivabilityP Entail Impossibility? (¬1.1) holds
that if an ideal conceiver, as construed above, finds P inconceivableP,
then P is impossible. What would this mean? Remember that I
finds P conceivableP when I has a propositional attitude whose
content yields an accurate description of P. Correspondingly, I
would find P inconceivableP if I cannot have a propositional at-
titude whose content yields an accurate description of P.
To see why, let’s specify the following scenario:
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Let I be an ideal conceiver. Let w f be a world in
which the Goldbach conjecture is false. Then w f is
possible iff I can conceiveP of w f . As a corollary, if
w f is inconceivableP for I, w f is impossible.
Note that a well-stated theorem is either necessarily true or not
at all. So if I can, in fact, conceive of w f , then w f is possible, and
consequently the Goldbach conjecture is (necessarily) false. On the
other hand, if w f is inconceivableP for I, then w f is impossible.
Well, so what? It might be. The problem is that, given certain
descriptions, we can easily stipulate the following scenario as well:
Let I be an ideal conceiver. Let wt be a world in
which the Goldbach conjecture is true. Then wt is
possible iff I can conceive of wt. As a corollary, if
wt is inconceivableP for I, wt is impossible.
Now, all it really takes to conceiveP of either w f or wt is to imagine
the following: “w f /wt is a world exactly like ours, except that the
Goldbach conjecture is false/true”. And conceivingP of this is child’s
play. We don’t even need I to do it. Which means that, if we’re fine
with using both types of conceivability in our definition, we can
very easily conceiveP of wt and w f simultaneously. Which is to say,
I can conceiveP of the Goldbach conjecture being simultaneously
necessarily true and necessarily false.
One might respond that, sinceIhas a base belief set that contains
only true beliefs, he cannot in fact conceiveP of a world in which a
contradiction holds. Consequently, the situation described above is
not coherent, which entails that the principle still holds.
I don’t think this response succeeds. All that it takes for I
to find P conceivableP is for I to be able to have a propositional
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attitude which yields an accurate description of P. And, while a
world containing a contradiction is not a possible world, it is in fact
a conceivableP world in this sense.
It gets worse. We can, in fact, have something like the following:
Let I be an ideal conceiver. Let w⊥ be a world
in which the Goldbach conjecture is both true and
false. Then w⊥ is possible iff I can conceiveP of w⊥.
Which is to say: I can conceiveP of an impossible world. This
does not strictly count against (¬1.1), but against the general version
of RR. The argument is that, if we use conceivabilityP, then RR
overgenerates possibility claims. In fact, it generates possibility
claims that are, by most lights, necessarily false.5
One could, if one wished, take this even further. The sentence
“the world at which the sentence ’every even number greater than
2 can be written as the sum of two odd primes’ is either true or
false is inconceivableP” (call this S) seems to yield some intelligible
propositional content, at least to the extent that it makes use of
concepts which, we’re able to see, are contradictory. So, we might
suppose, Imight be able to conceiveP of a world at which it’s true.
But that lands us in the unenviable position of being committed to
the position that I can conceiveP of a world where S is true and
where the sentence “it is true that every even number greater than
2 can be written as the sum of two odd primes” is also true. Which
means that I is again conceivingP of an impossible world.
5This argument can be lodged against certain other modal epistemologies.
For a similar argument against some theses of Timothy Williamson, see Roca-
Royes (2011b). The phrase “overgenerates possibility claims” is, in fact, hers.
60
One might be tempted to claim that, because this is in fact an
impossible world, I would not be able to conceiveP of it. After all,
I is supposed to have only true beliefs in their base belief set, and
presumably this would include the truth or falsity of the Goldbach
conjecture. IfIwere to conceiveP of w⊥, he will in fact be conceivingP
of a contradiction, which seems incompatible with the notion of him
possessing a base belief set containing only true beliefs.
There is both an easy and a hard response to this argument. The
easy one is that this is just the re-assertion of the relevant version of
RR (or, more accurately, of one of its consequences, ¬^φ→ ¬Caφ),
since the argument can’t get off the ground without the assump-
tion that impossible things are not conceivableP. Consequently the
response begs the question. But maybe this is overly flippant
The hard response is that we seem to be able to conceiveP of
what are–under regular assumptions–“impossible” situations. For
instance, some philosophers have argued that (a very restricted class
or realm of) contradictions are rationally believable.6 The sugges-
tion is not that they are correct. It is that the fact that there is a very
detailed account of just how contradictions might under certain cir-
cumstances be true counts as evidence that we in fact can conceiveP
of “impossible worlds.” And the fact that we can understand what
such people say and make sense of their arguments–perhaps even
while dismissing it as “monstrous moonshine”–counts as some ev-
idence that these arguments are at least intelligible, even if false.
6For an example see Priest (1998).
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2.2. Does InconceivabilityO Entail Impossibility? (¬1.2) holds
that if an ideal conceiver I finds P inconceivableO, then P is impos-
sible. To expand a little, if I cannot have a sensory or quasi-sensory
mental representation (or suitable analog of a mental representa-
tion) of P. Naturally, I has all the properties attributed to him in the
past chapter.
Since the converse of RR is supposed to be a sort of entailment
relation as well, if we want to find a counterexample, we need to find
a case in which the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. In
other words, we need to find a case where something is (metaphys-
ically) possibly instantiated but is simultaneously inconceivableO.
Here’s a first shot: human vision only takes in a very, very small
part of the electromagnetic spectrum (wavelengths between 390-
700 nm). Anything on either the UV or IR ends of the spectrum are
consequently not visible. However, it is–or so runs the contention–
metaphysically possible that a human might have a visual system
that would be able to see other parts of the spectrum–say, with a
lower-end expansion of 200 nm or so. Further, the contention is that
this other human will have a series of accompanying phenomenal
experiences totally closed off to humans–like the author and the
reader7–who have the visual capacities common to humans.
This limitation extends to our ideal conceiver. We argued earlier
that the ideal conceiver should only be endowed with–maximally
excellent–human faculties, since we are interested in what modal
7Presumably.
62
knowledge we might come to have through some sort of conceivabil-
ity process. Consequently,Iwill have only the human capacities for
phenomenal experience. Since I has no access to the phenomenal
experience of seeing “ultra-yellow” or “infra-blue” or some other
appropriately-named new color, he will not be able to have a sen-
sory or quasi-sensory mental representation of these colors, which
is the same as saying that he finds that (phenomenal) state of affairs
inconceivableO.
This argument can be pretty easily reproduced for different sorts
of inconceivableO situations; all that would be required for the new
argument would be to represent a different inconceivableO by P. The
natural question, then, is whether or not there are other instances of
this kind on offer.
Another possible argument of this type comes to us from quan-
tum mechanics. Suppose that we have a fermion of spin- 12 with







where |±z〉 are basis vectors of a Hilbert space. It’s possible to
get a decent intuitive hold on what “spin” is (as many physics
undergraduates discover during their second or third year of study),
even though there is no classical analog to this phenomenon. It may
even be possible to have an accurate phenomenal representation of
what fermion spin is like.8 For the sake of argument, let’s suppose
that I might have an accurate sensory or quasi-sensory mental
8For instance, I have a mental picture of what spin might be like, but I don’t
think it’s terribly accurate, since for most purposes fermions have all the extension
of a geometrical point.
63
representation of what spin is. Even if this is so, however, it is hard
to see just how I might be able to make sense of the fact that
∣∣∣ψ〉
has, not a definite spin, but instead a superposition of the different
spins a single fermion of the relevant spin might have.
By analogy, it’s difficult to get a good intuitive grasp of torque, at
least at first. After a bit of work, however, one can develop the req-
uisite intuition. It is hard to make sense of how one might develop
the intuition of a rotor, for instance, experiencing a superposition
of torque. This is not a matter of simple mental laziness or lack
of cognitive success, but instead a matter of not having the correct
concepts or mental capacities for being able to get a picture of this.
In the case of torque, it is not terribly difficult to see why. The
torque experienced by an object is given by the equation τ = r × F,
where r is the vector which gives the position of the object under
consideration, and F is the force the object experiences.
As a measurable, physical quantity, produced by other measur-
able physical properties, it makes little intuitive sense to talk about
a superposition of torque, as if an object were undergoing a torque
of 50% 60 N·m and 50% 75 N·m. Since we ordinarily brush up
against the macroscopic world, which works (to a very good local
approximation), we might expect it to shape our pre-philosophical
intuitions and our concepts, to a large extent. Against that back-
ground, it is unsurprising that we should find states of affairs not
describable in classical terms inconceivableO.
One might object–not unreasonably, perhaps–that basing an ar-
gument about what our powers of conceivingO can and can’t do on
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so esoteric a notion as spin does a bit of violence to the intended
goal. Maybe this is true, and maybe not. But for the sake of argu-
ment, let us grant that there is some merit to this counterargument.
Is the defender of conceivabilityO out of the woods yet?
No. Take a concept which is a good deal less abstract and ap-
prehensible: spatial position. It turns out that we can run a very
similar argument with this description of a quantum state. Con-
sider our old friend the fermion of spin-12 . The general form of
∣∣∣ψ〉’s







where N represents the number of possible positions the particle
could occupy, and the |xi〉 are basis vectors of the position space. In
much the same way as before, the particle is thought to in some
sense be in all the possible spatial configurations of the system at
once. From this we make much the same argument as before, only
with what seems like more force. It might be possible, once one
develops one’s concept of spin more rigorously, that one might be
able to have the relevant phenomenal experience that would count
as conceivingO. But in the case of spatial position, this option doesn’t
seem to actually be an option: we actually have the concept of spatial
position, and it doesn’t seem to admit of bi-location.
In the last two examples, there was a tacit assumption: namely,
that some version of scientific realism is true. Under this view, the
elements of our best physical theories do indeed describe the real
world; not only our phenomenology (in the physical sense), but
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also our mathematical formalisms are thought to have thoroughly
metaphysical implications–though naturally there can be a range
of disagreement as to what precisely those implications are. So, in a
very real sense, this argument will stand or fall according to whether
or not we think that our physical theories do carry those sorts of
implications. Consequently, if one is a scientific realist, one should
accept this argument or give up scientific realism. The scientific
anti-realist, however, need not accept this version of the argument.
There are a few ways one could counter this argument. First,
one could say that the state of affairs described by P is not possible.
In the two cases offered above, this can be accomplished by, first,
denying that humans slightly differently constituted could possibly
have the relevant phenomenal experiences; and second, by either
denying that the states of affairs described are in fact inconceivableO
or by adopting a certain sort of scientific anti-realism.
The first option isn’t a very promising one. It makes the particu-
lar sort of vision that humans have a(n) (modally) essential property
of Homo sapiens, which does not seem like a very promising line of
argument. Certain things seems like they might count as essential
properties of a human–being a featherless biped, for instance–but
a very specified, particular sort of vision doesn’t seem to be one of
them. The first part of the second option seems equally unpromis-
ing. Moreover, the concept of spatial position works against him in
this instance. Continuous objects may in some sense be said to “be”
in multiple spatially connected but distinct places at once, but such
is not (to the best of my knowledge) the case with discrete objects.
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As to the second part of the second option, this will, as indicated
above, depend upon whether he is a realist or not.
Another option is to deny that I really finds P inconceivableO.
This seems like a weak line of attack, mainly because of how we
construed the ideal conceiver in the first place. Speculative phi-
losophy is only as good as the methods we can use to arrive at its
theses; if such a method is unusable, or is only useful in very par-
ticular circumstances, the theses based upon it fall. If one were to
deny that I finds P inconceivableO, one would need to impute him
faculties that, to the best of my knowledge, no human possesses.
It’s reasonable to believe that such entities possibly exist, but basing
this notion of conceivabilityO on just such an exemplary entity does
little to aid the modal metaphysician or epistemologist. At best, this
action would render conceivabilityO arguments an appeal to (hypo-
thetical) testimony, and this seems a tenuous ground of knowledge
at best.
Behind the preceding discussion of “quasi-sensory” states and so
on hangs the question of what these states comprise. In particular,
which concepts does I employ in his exercises?9 This is a deep
question, but not one which is the topic of this thesis, and so its
treatment will be brief. The key question is just how we get our
9See Menzies (1998) and Jarvis (2012) for this sort of concept-based theory
of imagination. The former ties modality as such into conceivability. Ichikawa
and Jarvis mostly treat with a notion of conceptual possibility. In their language,
the argument of this section amounts to a denial of MMR from right to left.
Peacocke (1997, 1998, 2002) defends a princple-based account of modality which
is not based on conceivability (at least not explicitly). Here the important thing
is not the concepts being employed, but the rules (the “Principles of Possibility”)
according to which they are assessed.
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concepts. If one thinks that these concepts are derived, at the last,
from sensory experience, then our acts of conceivingO (and therefore
I’s acts of conceivingO) bottom out on objects acquired via our
sensory field. And we are not the sorts of creatures which have
sensory apparatus keen enough to form concepts by experience of
the sub-atomic world. This brings accounts of this sort under fire
from the discussions above.
2.3. Does Ideal Negative Inconceivability entail Impossibil-
ity? Ideal negative conceivability holds that P is conceivablein by I
just in case I cannot rule out P a priori. Another way of saying this
is that ¬P is not a priori. On the view of people who defend this
or a related version of conceivability, there is an important relation
between the necessary and the a priori. For instance, Chalmers ar-
gues that while perhaps not all modal truths are a priori (recalling,
for instance, Kripke’s arguments to the contrary), all modal truths
are at least scrutable from truths determinable a priori:
[W]hat about metaphysical modality? Here it is fa-
miliar that truths such as ’it is necessary that water
is H2O’ and ’It is necessary that Hesperus is Phos-
phorus’ can be true without being a priori. In these
cases, though, it is highly plausible that these truths
are a priori entailed by nonmodal truths: in partic-
ular, by ’Water is H2O’ and ’Hesperus is Phospho-
rus’. Given that the relevant expressions are rigid
(de jure), sentences such as ’If Hesperus is Phospho-
rus, it is necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is a
priori. So long as the relevant nonmodal truths are
scrutable from PQTI, the modal truths are scrutable
as well.10
10Chalmers (2012), p. 234.
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On the appropriate scrutability thesis, the connection between
the a priori and the necessary would be something like the fol-
lowing: Φ is a priori scrutable (from an appropriate base) iff Φ is
necessary. The right-to-left direction is pretty clearly a consequence
of a scrutability thesis. The left-to-right direction is slightly more
complicated, especially if Φ contains any sort of vague predicates,
partial descriptions of objects, or similarly incomplete notions. If
this is the case, Φ might turn out to be some statement like “The sky
is blue”. Given the notion of scrutability at work, it’s not hard to
see that this turns out to be (in our sense) scrutable, but it is not in
any obvious sense necessary,
One way one could solve this problem would be to ensure that Φ
is described in such a way to ensure that its modal scope is explicit.
For instance, the statement “The sky is blue” has a certain amount
of relativity due to the utterer. When I utter “The sky is blue” in
the actual world, I mean (presumably) that the sky at the actual
world is (what I refer to and experience as) blue. In order to avoid
this sort of complication, one could adopt a rigidification clause:
each statement Φ is replaced in the base belief set of I by some
appropriate sentence (or proposition or non-linguistic object or...)
Φρ which specifies the worlds at which Φ holds. For instance, if Φ
represents the statement “The sky is blue”, Φρ would represent the
statement “At worlds w1,w2,...wn, the sky is blue”.11
11With, of course, the requisite notion of “blue”, the proviso that the statement
is indexed to a particular time (to allow for the possibility that the colour of the
sky may vary over time), and other stipulations that would make the statement
come out true in the actual world.
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This seems to mitigate the difficulty encountered earlier. Should
a statement of the type Φρ turn out to be scrutable a priori, it seems
quite plausible that it should turn out to be necessary. When we
speak of a possible world, we are implicitly making the assumption
that the world we speak of is maximally complete–that is, we refer
to the totality of facts true in the particular world w whenever we
say something like “x is true at w”. Now suppose that a statement
like “possibly, x is not true at w” were true, while simultaneously
the statement “x is true at w” is true. Then there is some world w1
at which the statement “x is not true at w” is true. But there is no
accessibility relation R such that Rww1, since given the facts of w, it
is not true that “x is not true at w”. Hence there is no such world w1
accessible to w. The upshot of this is that if it is a priori scrutable
that a Φρ-type statement is true, then it is true in the actual world,
and thus at all possible worlds. This gives us the other end of the
biconditional.
A parallel version of this thesis cashed out in the language of
ideal negative conceivability would be something like the following:
Φρ is conceivablein iff Φρ is necessary. Concomitantly, we can say that
¬Φ is not conceivablein a priori iff ¬Φρ is not necessary–or, in other
words, if Φρ is possible. So our equivalence would look something
like ¬CΦρ ↔ ^Φρ. This gets us the conditional ^Φρ → ¬Φρ, which
in turn gets us the conditional¬¬CΦρ → ¬^Φρ, which is our desired
thesis.12
12Working classically and not intuitionistically, it should be said.
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Should one want to find a counterexample to (¬1.3), it is incum-
bent upon one to produce a case where something whose descrip-
tion is properly rigidified is not conceivablein but is nonetheless
possible.
What would it mean to produce such a counterexample? It
would involve producing a statement which is determinably false
a priori, but is in fact possibly true. At face value, one might be
tempted to think that a statement similar to the ones in the previous
section are what we are seeking. For instance, consider the state-
ment “a particle can fail to have a definite location”; on the surface,
that looks to be false a priori, and yet also true. This criticism loses
its edge when we expand the statement out to the following: “given
the formalism of quantum mechanics, it is coherent to suppose that
the position of a particle can be described in terms of a superposition
of possible positions.” Since our ideal conceiver has a maximally
descriptive base belief set (a PQTI-complete one, to adopt Chalmers’
terminology for a moment), he will no doubt be able to conform the
latter statement to his true beliefs concerning quantum mechanics,
and so the problem would seem to be dissolved.
There seems to be a problem distinct from this one, and that
is that different–entirely accurate–descriptions of the same entity
(or state of affairs or...) may very well yield differing judgments
concerning their conceivabilityin or inconceivabilityin. Suppose, for
instance, that I ask our ideal conceiver to tell me whether or not
he can conceivein of the state of affairs accurately described by the
statement “a system of sub-atomic particles, accurately described
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by the correct laws of quantum mechanics, having a determinate
position without being observed.” Supposing that the standard
account of quantum mechanics is true, he will likely tell me that it is
in fact inconceivablein that such a situation should arise. From this,
accepting (¬1.3), we ought to conclude that such a state of affairs is
not possible.
Now suppose I were to ask him to conceivein of the state of affairs
accurately described by the statement “a monocotyledon during
the late Cretaceous having a determinate position without being
measured.” What statement would he return? My suspicion is
that he will return the answer that such a state of affairs is in fact
conceivablein. The problem here lies in the fact that the two state-
ments in fact can accurately describe the self-same state of affairs.The
monocotyledon, after all, is composed of proteins and other biolog-
ical components, which in turn are composed of chemical elements,
which in turn are certain types of atoms which contain certain types
and numbers of sub-atomic particles, which are subject to the laws
of quantum mechanics. The result, then, is that our ideal conceiver
calls the same state of affairs conceivablein and inconceivablein–and
thus, both possible and impossible.
This is similar to an arrangement offered by David Albert. The
proposed experiment involves a “black” electron going through
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a measuring device for “hardness,” and a competent13 observer
named Martha:
[...]It follows from the linearity of the dynamical
equations of motion (if those equations are right),
and from what it means to be a competent observer
of the position of the pointer, that the state when
Martha’s done is with certainty going to be
(4.7) 1√
2
|“hard”〉o |“hard”〉m |hard〉e+ 1√2 |“soft”〉o |“soft”〉m |soft〉e
That’s what the dynamics entails.
And of course what the postulate of collapse en-
tails is that when Martha’s all done, then
(4.8) either |“hard”〉o |“hard”〉m |hard〉e (with prob-
ability 12 )
or |“soft”〉o |“soft”〉m |soft〉e (with probability
1
2 )
is going to obtain.
And (4.7) and (4.8) are empirically different. The
state described in (4.8) is the one that’s right; (4.7)
is unspeakably strange. The state described in (4.7)
is at odds with what we know of ourselves by direct
introspection[...]it’s a state in which there is no matter
of fact about whether or not Martha thinks the pointer is
pointing in any particular direction.14
The point Albert seems to be making is that there is a severe dif-
ference between our ordinary macroscopic experience and what is
13See Albert (1992), p. 77: “What it means for Martha to be a competent ob-
server of the position of a pointer is that whenever Martha looks at a pointer that’s
pointing to “hard,” she eventually comes to believe that the pointer is pointing to
“hard”; and that whenever Martha looks at a pointer that’s pointing to “soft,” she
eventually comes to believe that the pointer is pointing to “soft”.”
14ibid, pp. 77–79. I have changed the numerical designations a little for ease
of reference.
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entailed by one of our best physical theories (or at least by the stan-
dard interpretation of it). This isn’t quite the point made above, but
it is closely connected, because we can run a very similar argument
as above here.
Suppose I ask out ideal conceiver to undertake the relevant men-
tal process needed to determine whether (4.7) is a conceivablein state
of affairs. He pauses for a moment, looks up, and says that it is.
Then I ask him whether (4.8) is a conceivablein state of affairs. There
are two possibilities here: either he says it is, or it isn’t. (Obviously.)
Suppose he says that it is conceivablein. Then we clearly have a
problem, because the states of affairs described by (4.7) and (4.8) are
not compatible ones. It isn’t that neither of these states of affairs are
possible when taken together in different world, but that they can’t
be jointly true in a world sufficiently like ours as to be described
by the assumptions being made at the outset. In other words, it’s
certainly possible for (4.8) to obtain in a world that doesn’t func-
tion according to the releepvant dynamics Albert takes as operative
assumptions. Likewise, it’s possible for (4.7) to obtain in a world
where the kind of introspection Albert talks about (and presumably
the ideal conceiver would need) isn’t possible. But these two are
incompatible if taken to be true at the same world.
And that is precisely what we want to be true if we want to
hold onto this notion. Our ideal conceiver has essentially human
cognitive powers, even if greatly enhanced and equipped with a
maximally and relevantly complete base belief set. And thus the
74
result that should be returned, if the ideal conceiver is using cor-
rect phenomenological assumptions and postulates about what that
kind of procedure is usually like for humans, is (4.8). On the other
hand, if he bases his conceivingin on a comparison of the correct
quantum-dynamical approach (assuming, of course, that our quan-
tum theory is complete enough to allow us to say that the equations
of motion and evolution of state represent the real world), he will
come to the conclusion that (4.7) is correct. And these are mutually
incompatible states of affairs.
This creates an obvious problem. If the ideal conceiver, when
asked to conceivein of the state of affairs that is a result of the thought
experiment suggested by Albert, uses all the contradiction-detection
and reasoning faculties at his disposal, he could arrive at one of four
possible conclusions:
(1) (4.7) is the correct representation and (4.8) is the false one.
(2) (4.8) is the correct representation and (4.7) is the false one.
(3) Both (4.7) and (4.8) are correct representations.
(4) Neither (4.7) and (4.8) are correct representations.
Suppose (1) is correct. Then our regular introspective faculties are
faulty for these sorts of situations. But it is hard to see just how
one could maintain this and still retain the definition of an ideal
conceiver that we’ve been working with. Certainly there are some
states of affairs which our ideal conceiver will be able to conceivein of
by using just these phenomenological principles or correct descrip-
tions (for instance, whether it is possible for an object to be both
green and blue all over, under the correct phenomenal description
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of both green and blue, and so forth). And we’re going to want to be
able to say that using these faculties to determine their possibility
(or lack thereof) is a reliable heuristic. But it’s hard to see how we
can maintain this when they fail in domains where, by their own
lights, they should be accurate. If using all faculties together leads
to contradictory conclusions, that counts against the reliability of
them in general.
Considering whether (2) is correct doesn’t seem to bear good
results either. It is just to jettison one set of primary conceivabil-
ity heuristics for another. If our quantum-mechanical theories are
mistaken in this arena and the correct phenomenal principles are
the ones to be used, then we run into virtually the same problem
as before, only with the positions reversed. And if we suppose that
here are phenomenal laws which are not reducible to microphys-
ical laws, and are in some deep sense fundamental, then it is hard
to see which of these decisions we should respect. If two (suppos-
edly fundamental) sets of laws yield inconsistent descriptions of
a situation in which both would seem applicable, then we have a
problem–unless there is some deeper set of laws to which we need
to make recourse in order to settle the dispute. But postulating such
a fudge is to trade one mystery for another; this is essentially the
postulation of an oracle, which we forbade in our formulation of
the ideal conceiver. So this isn’t a very viable solution.
If (3) is correct, then we have a rank contradiction. These two
states are mutually incompatible, and so (3) has to be inconceivablein
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as well if we’ve endowed our ideal conceiver with the law of non-
contradiction.
If (4) is the correct representation, then both our quantum-
dynamical theories and psychophysical or phenomenological principles–
both of which we have what looks like very god reason to think are
true–are fundamentally mistaken or flawed, in ways we have no
knowledge of. It is possible that there is some unifying description
that will render the end of the thought experiment intelligible to
someone in possession of the correct theory, but that’s not of much
assistance to us. The person defending (¬1.3) can simply say “no,
there is a correct description but we just don’t know it yet,” but
this is not a very convincing argument. Arguably, our confidence
in our best quantum-dynamical theories and at least some tier of
our phenomenological experiences should exceed our confidence in
(¬1.3), since it’s founded on them in the first place.15 Thus, it seems
on the face of it more warranted to reject (¬1.3) than to reject either
of them.
Maybe there’s another way out. For instance, many physicalists
would hold that our psychophysical and phenomenal lives are in
the end reducible to the neurochemistry of particular brain states
which accompany them. For them, each correct phenomenal prin-
ciple would be an elliptical for an exhaustive (though in all likeli-
hood, extremely un-economical) chemical or physical description
of that particular brain state. For instance, one could hold that the
15Recall that the base belief set, if it’s to be complete, is going to have to contain
all the true beliefs that allow our ideal conceiver to reach these conclusions. So in
some sense these principles are logically prior to (¬1.3).
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phenomenological description of the particular principle in ques-
tions can be Ramseyfied to contain only terms which are either
reducible to purely physical terms or else be themselves purely
physical terms.16 Since the physical is fundamental, then, any con-
flict between what our phenomenal experience seems to tell us and
what our best physical theories tell us will be resolved in favor of
the physical theory.
The trouble with this is that, even if descriptions of phenomenal
laws all have Ramsey sentences containing only physical terms, the
phenomenal descriptions will still have to be accurate, even if only
as a placeholder. Any inconsistency with our best physical theories
that occurs as a correct application of the phenomenal laws will
itself have to come as a result of a conflict between differing parts of
our best physical theories, which is hardly a less daunting problem.
Physicalists or functionalists tend to be queasy about relying on
introspection as any sort of infallible guide, so one might be tempted
to say that the apparent antinomy is a result of one of those failures.
But simply denying that introspection is always reliable isn’t enough
to win the argument, since its general reliability is not in question.
One has to instead say that, in situations of this particular type,
introspection is unreliable. Simply using this as a one-off example
of its unreliability is a bit too close to special pleading for comfort.
But this is a situation in which most of us think that introspection
is valid, since–on a purely pragmatic level–it yields good results in
other cases. For instance: I make a free throw during a game of
16A la David Lewis, in Lewis (1972).
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basketball, and my introspective judgment while making the shot
tells me that the result will be that either the ball will go through
the hoop or it will not; and, every time I have made that judgment,
the disjunction has turned out to represent the outcome accurately.
So any argument to the contrary has to shoulder the burden of
explaining why this sort of introspection is in general reliable, but
in this case not reliable.
A point of clarification is in order. In the preceding discus-
sion, the reader may have gotten the impression that I’m taking the
position that observation by some consciousness-bearing entity is
essential to wave-function collapse. That is, in order for there to be
a fact–of–the–matter (in the way we ordinarily like to think of it)
about how the world is, there has to be some conscious observer to
observe (however we want to understand that term) the evolution of
a wave-function and thus to collapse it. This might evoke a certain
amount of incredulity in the reader, and still more in the proponent
of the inconceivabilityin rule. “Surely,” he says, a mischievous glint
in his eye, “if you’re allowed to use some sort of conscious observer,
existent whenever there is wave-function collapse, I’m allowed to
use an ideal conceiver with abilities beyond the mere human in
order to circumvent the problems you raise!”
This would be both an understandable and–to my mind–not en-
tirely incorrect response, if indeed this argument were being made
Luckily, it is not. It does not require or assume that there is some
sort of necessarily phenomenal or conscious component to wave-
function collapse. All that is assumed is that there is, in the way
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we ordinarily understand it, a fact–of–the–matter about, say, the
answer that Martha’s going to give. And this in turn–or so the
claim goes–requires wave-function collapse. Now certainly, the
way in which we think that wave-function collapse normally oc-
curs is in fact when a conscious observer makes a measurement
of a given quantum-mechanical system.17 No particular assump-
tions are made, nor any doctrines advanced, concerning what pre-
cisely causes wave-function collapse, and certainly not the quasi-
idealistic doctrine that conscious observers are needed for that to take
place. All that is required is the following: if there is to be a fact-
of-the-matter about physical systems or macroscopic objects more
generally, wave-function collapse (provided that this is the correct
interpretation of quantum mechanics) should have taken place.18
Of course, it may turn out that the orthodox interpretation of
quantum mechanics is false. Perhaps the pilot-wave or many-
worlds interpretations are correct. The argument offered above is
not (quite) predicated on the truth of the orthodox version. Rather,
17Though strictly speaking, I think one might make do by simply saying that
what is required is that a measurement of the system is somehow made, since–
as far as I understand it–the conscious registering of the particular result of the
measurement is not what determines that result, but rather the measurement
itself.
18I say “fact-of-the-matter,” and this may induce the reader to think I mean
determinate fact-of-the-matter, in the sense of saying of a given system, “this
and only this will happen.” What I have in mind is a little softer, and not so
proscriptive. It is more like the following: for a system (under a suitably broad
interpretation of that word, encompassing physics, day–to–day experience, and
so on) to admit of a fact–of–the–matter, it must have some definite, though not
necessarily determinate, configuration. This admits of, for instance, disjunctive
facts–of–the–matter: either Chelsea will win the match, or Manchester will win it.
The fact–of–the–matter of the outcome of the soccer match (prior to its conclusion)
is not determinate in the sense of not allowing for a certain outcome, but is definite,
in the following sense: one of the two teams will win the match, assuming draws
are disallowed. There will be no “state mixture.”
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it maintains the following: we have physical models of the world
which conflict in certain ways with some theoretical accounts of
modal knowledge. If we are being good scientific realists, then we
will need to take this tension seriously. This does not necessarily
amount to a rejection of the modal theory, but it does highlight the
need for a reassessment.
This argument used the idea of wave-function collapse and
quantum-mechanical systems in an attempt at precisification and
illustration. It is possible, however, that the reader has taken that
to be the sum total of the argument. This would be an incomplete
notion, since the class of problems envisioned goes a certain degree
further. The idea is, instead, that it seems like certain states of af-
fairs, where this phrase is taken in its most broad interpretation,
may be accurately and irreducibly portrayed in terms of conflicting
and (apparently) mutually exclusive descriptions.
To get at what this means, it may be helpful to examine a
slightly more prosaic example. Let us borrow an example from
Miss Anscombe:
Kant introduces the idea of “legislating for oneself,”
which is as absurd as if in these days, when major-
ity votes command great respect, one were to call
each reflective decision a man made a vote result-
ing in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is
overwhelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of
legislation requires superior power in the legisla-
tor. His own rigoristic convictions on the subject of
lying were so intense that it never occurred to him
that a lie could be relevantly described as anything
but just a lie (e.g. as “a lie in such-and-such circum-
stances”). His rule about universalizable maxims is
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useless without stipulations as to what shall count
as a relevant description of an action with a view to
constructing a maxim about it.19
The idea is that, under the Kantian system, one is left without
a guide to what precisely will cast the vote as to the relevancy–or
indeed the accuracy–of a certain description of the action in question.
Certainly one might very well give assent to the statement “lying
is wrong,” but one would likely find it a little more difficult to
agree with the statement “lying to the SS concerning the Jews in
your basement, with an eye towards protecting the innocent, is
wrong.” But one may, without sacrificing a whit of accuracy or even
relevancy, say that the description of “lying” or “lying towards a
good end” fits the situation entirely accurately. And the point is
that the system has a hard time telling you, without being able to
make reference to consequences, just which of these descriptions is
the one you should use when trying to see whether your maxim
might be a universal law. So we get an inconsistency, because
the state of affairs is–irreducibly and accurately–described in terms
where either maxim applies. And introducing a stop-gap measure
to solve this particular case is not going to be good, because these
sorts of rules are supposed to be generally applicable.
Cases of intentional action are also intriguing here. Miss Anscombe
has another illustrative example of this peculiarity: suppose a bird
lands on a twig to pick at some food on the twig. This twig also
happens to be smeared with bird-lime (a substance used for trap-
ping birds). But “[t]he bird wanted to land on the twig alright,
19Anscombe (1958), p. 2.
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but did not want to land on a twig smeared with bird-lime.”20 The
moral we should draw from the example is that one can, without
loss of accuracy, describe the same state of affairs–the bird landing
on just this or that twig–by two descriptions. First, “the bird in-
tended to land on that twig with the bird-seed,” and second, “the
bird intended to land on that twig with the bird-lime.” If I ask I
whether he can conceivein of the state of affairs under both descrip-
tions, my suspicion is that he would answer “yes” to the former.
Accompanying that suspicion is one which says that he would find
the second somewhat more difficult. To the degree that birds are
capable of intentional action, and to the degree that they are ca-
pable of rational examination, it would be quite odd to treat the
bird (rationally) taking an ultimately detrimental action. The case is
one of incomplete knowledge, to be sure, but the paradox remains:
the state of affairs becomes perfectly conceivablein under one (com-
pletely accurate) description, and somewhat more opaque under
another (equally accurate) description.
A possible–and interesting–response to this view might be to
treat statements of the form “x intends to φ” as not admitting of free
substitutions of φ. To treat statements such as “The bird intends
to φ” as admitting of liberally substituting different (true) descrip-
tions of an action φ would, on this view, be akin to entering into a
“second grade of intentional involvement.” Substituting in differ-
ent descriptions of φwill change the intension of the statement, and
consequently its truth value. Say Λ is a statement operator standing
20Anscombe (1982), p. 209.
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for “intends to”. Then statements of the form Λxφ for an agent x
and an action φwill only admit of substitutions for φwhenever the
new description of x’s action is a description reflecting some part of
his φ-ing that he knows he does.21
So cases involving statements of the type Λxφ seem to be more
problematic. This doesn’t seem to be so in the case of the righteous
liar, however, since it involved no such statement operation. All
that we are required to analyze are the descriptions of the lie, one
with reference to the action, one with reference to the intention of
the action. But here the question is not whether the liar intended
to lie, else the problem would not arise. Hence, the antecedent
problem–that of asserting the liar intended an action he did not–is
not of particularly serious consequence here.
The general case of this puzzle goes roughly as follows. Some
states of affairs are describable in multiple ways. Some states of
affairs are even describable in multiple, equally– and irreducibly–
accurate ways. And some of these simultaneously accurate de-
scriptions are mutually incompatible–in Anscombe’s case, “lying”
and “lying to protect the innocent”; in Albert’s case, the every-
day phenomenal description and the quantum-mechanical descrip-
tion. Single-instance fudges, which tell you which description is
correct in a single case are not useful, because they set up larger
conflicts between two supposedly fundamental and correct sets of
generally-applicable principles. And general rules of thumb–e.g.,
“not lying always wins,” “physics trumps phenomenology”–are
21This response runs along the lines of Anscombe’s own analysis of such
situations; see pp. 12-13 of Anscombe (1963).
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problematical, because they don’t explain the (at the very least ap-
parent) applicability of the set of maxims and/or principles which
are deemed to not apply, which seems to cut against their inclusion
in the “fundamental” category. This, in the end, leads to what we
might characterize as “antinomies of pure conception.”
3. The upshot
If the previous sections hold, then the notion that inconceivabil-
ity leads to impossibility is somewhat fraught. How is this relevant
to RR? It doesn’t immediately imply that it’s false, since RR is logi-
cally equivalent, not to the inconceivability thesis, but to the thesis
that impossibility implies inconceivability.
There’s another worry. In the case of (¬1.3), we say that P is
inconceivable if an ideal conceiver can rule P out on purely a priori
grounds. Now, if P is ruled out on these grounds, this means that
the falsehood of P is determined on those grounds, which entails
that the truth of ¬P is a priori.The claim is, further, that if ¬P is a
priori, P cannot be. This should not be difficult to believe. After all,
if one denies that P is not a priori, then one is left in the situation of
believing both that ¬P is and that P might be a priori.
If P is inconceivable, P is not a priori. This doesn’t seem mo-
mentous. But realize for a moment what this would mean. The
state of affairs “P is not a priori” is implied by the state of affairs “P
is inconceivable,” but it is also on the face of it compatible with the
situation of P’s being conceivable. For all the phrase “P is conceiv-
able” means in this context is that P is not ruled out a priori. But if
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we suppose that P is both not ruled out a priori and that P is not a
priori–which is really just another way of saying that neither P nor
¬P are a priori–there isn’t any apparent contradiction, which there
very much should be if P is both inconceivable and conceivable. One
way of getting around the dilemma would be to maintain that P’s
not being a priori in fact implies that P is ruled out a priori. But
there seem to be some problems with just such a position. For one
thing, this would preclude there being any true proposition whose
truth is not determinable a priori, since–say–if a proposition was
determinably true a posteriori but not a priori, it would not be true
a priori, and consequently it would be ruled out a priori. This would
leave one in the situation of having a proposition whose negation is
true a priori but which is also true a posteriori. This is–it should go
without saying–a tough pill to swallow, since there seem to be any
number of propositions–those concerning correct legal judgments,
say–whose truth is determinable in this way.
The claim isn’t that this constitutes a thorough refutation of the
two theses presented so far, because in order to do that one would
need to offer a much more thorough argument than the one pre-
sented. In fact, there’s a very simple way of avoiding the apparent
paradox: if one were to maintain, that for every proposition P, ei-
ther P or ¬P is a priori, the problem disappears quite easily. This
is distinct from saying that P is not determinable a posteriori, as
we did above, since it doesn’t seem impossible for the truth of a
given proposition might be determinable both a priori and a poste-
riori. For instance, one might learn the truth of the proposition “The
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basketball will fall when thrown” either by extrapolation from Ein-
stein’s field equations, knowledge of what the noun “basketball”
means, and exhaustive knowledge of the initial conditions of the
ball/player system, or by observing, as did our forefathers through-
out most of history, that stuff falls downwards when not held up
(barring very unusual situations, e.g., parabolic flight paths).
Rather, the point is this: if we think that conceivability of a cer-
tain kind does indicate–in fact, entail–possibility, then one would
expect–I claim–expect for there not to be situations in which there’s
an apparent compatibility between P’s being conceivable and P’s be-
ing inconceivable (in the appropriate way). This would be expected
because the relationship is supposed to be one of entailment, rather
than reliability. If the relation were like that between, say, our per-
ception of the eternal world and the actual external world (one of re-
liability), any apparent compatibility between situations which have
some contradiction or inconsistency in their perceptually-relevant
elements wouldn’t refute the reliability. All it would indicate is that
the apparatus can produce mistaken results–and as we don’t think
that such paradoxes mean our senses are de facto unreliable22, we
wouldn’t think that such inconsistencies would mean conceivability
would be totally unreliable.
On the other hand, if we think that there’s some sort of more
structural relation between conceivability and possibility of the kind
we’ve been talking about, we’d expect that there are none of these
sorts of compatabilities; the structure would preclude them. But,
22At least, the non-sceptics amongst us do.
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as argued above, there do in fact seem to be such compatabilities,
which is the opposite of the expected result. This doesn’t mean the
position is roundly refuted. Instead, it gives good reason to believe
either that the position as such is false or else the position as formulated
is false.
The argument has, at present, been against the inference from
conceivability to possibility, but the consequences of the mentioned
inquietudes extend a bit further. Take, for example, the thesis
(sometimes called “modal rationalism”) that possible worlds just
are mental representations; more specifically, that the necessary is
the a priori. Keith Hossack, for example, has it that “According to
modal rationalism, the necessary is the a priori. If that is correct,
we can give the following definitions: a fact is necessary if it is a
priori, contingent.”23 Suppose P is a proposition whose negation is
a prioi. It follows then that P is necessarily false, and hence is true
in no possible world. This very neatly comes within the purview of
the arguments we’ve been making–certain kinds of P-worlds are in
fact possible (actual, even), but if we put on our modal rationalist
hats for a moment, we’d be led to conclude that they aren’t.
What’s a nice modal rationalist to do? Supposing the offered
arguments are successful, there are at least two options. One is to
give up modal rationalism wholesale; the other is clarify precisely
which a priori propositions are necessary. Hossack constructs the
relevant notion of aprioricity as follows:
23Hossack (2007), p. 438.
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We begin by defining the primitive: a fact is prim-
itive if in favourable circumstances a person can
know the fact just by taking thought.[...] We define
the a priori in terms of the primitive, as follows.
First, we stipulate that every primitive fact is a pri-
ori. Next, we stipulate that all and only the logical
consequences of a priori facts are a priori also. Fi-
nally we define logical consequence in terms of the
primitive. Say a relation R is a consequence rela-
tion if it is a structural relation with the following
property: it is primitive that whenever some propo-
sitions Σ stand in R to a proposition P, then if Σ are
all true, then P is true also.24
I suppose that one could restrict the “favorable circumstances” in
some way that would disallow the multiple-descriptions problems
arising from using different sorts of descriptions (or other types of
such arguments): via some tie-breaking clause between the conflict-
ing principles or laws of description, to give one example. But it’s
not clear how this would avoid the problems that we encountered
in the previous example. On the other hand, one could say that any
state of affairs which yields the kind of propositions that accurately
describe it in a mutually-inconsistent way are not, in fact, a priori;
thus one avoids the problem by denying it. But all this does is elim-
inate P as an a priori proposition; P is contingent if P is not a priori,
but there’s still the problem that P yields mutually inconsistent yet
accurate descriptions. If I were to represent a P-world as “a world
w at which all accurate descriptions of P are true,” all I would be
doing is making the inconsistencies implicit. All worlds containing
inconsistent yet actualized propositions contain contradictions, and
24ibid., p. 439.
89
these are impossible worlds. So we still get ¬P, necessarily, and
we’re back where we started.
One might be concerned, on the other hand, that the denial of the
coextensivity between the conceivable and the possible commits one
to a sort of modal dualism. On this view, metaphysical modality
and epistemic modality are two fundamentally different sorts of
things. And this–or so the worry goes–is an un-parsimonious view.
Take Frank Jackson, for instance:
I have two reasons for holding that there is only one
sense of necessity and possibility in play here. The
first is Occamist. We should not multiply senses of
necessity beyond necessity. The phenomena of the
necessary a posteriori, and of essential properties,
can be explained in terms of one unitary notion of a
set of possible worlds. The phenomena do not call
for a multiplication of senses of possibility and ne-
cessity, and in particular for a distinction among the
possible worlds between the metaphysically possi-
ble ones and the conceptually possible ones.25
So what’s a good Ockhamist to do? Certainly it is true that
it is more ontologically parsimonious to deal only with one class
of possible worlds (which requires identifying the epistemically
possible and the metaphysically possible). But if the argument
given above goes through, then the identification of the two commits
one to an even stranger ontological category: that of worlds with
contradictory features. If there are inconceivable worlds which
are also possible (actual, even), then either the identification is ill-
advised or else needs to be amended to allow for worlds which
are both conceptually possible (i.e., conceivable) and conceptually
25Jackson (2000), p. 70.
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impossible (i.e., inconceivable).26 And that is a queer metaphysic
indeed.
A further question needs to be addressed: how should this af-
fect confidence in RR? Suppose that, as argued above, there are
some propositions whose conceivability seems to be compatible
with their inconceivability. It’s intuitively appealing to think that
this produces a tension in the rationalist view. But just how much
of a tension does it produce, and just how should we then react to
the success of the argument? It’s hard to know how to proceed here
without endorsing a particular notion of just how belief-defeasing
works, and what should be the proper response to a general sort of
defeasibility argument. And that is not the purpose of this present
essay. Instead, the argument offered is methodological, one founded
on a general principle of theoretical compatibility.
We often think of predictive success as a hallmark of an effective
explanation of a phenomenon (or of a theory). One way of expli-
cating this notion is something like the following: if P is a group of
phenomena in need of an explanation, and τ is a theory which is
supposed to explain P, then τ should predict–that is, have amongst
its consequences–all elements of P.27 There is a related notion of
predictive success: keeping τ and P as before, τ should not be con-
sistent with the falsity of any of the constituent phenomena of P.
26For a fuller discussion of these sorts of arguments–though not one strictly
along the lines we’re pursuing–see Chapter 1 of Kment (2014).
27I concede that “supposed to explain” is a very vague phrase. I here mean it
in the highest level of generality, meant to encompass causal, grounding, and any
other kind of explanation. The notion of predictability is, to me, most comfortably
used in the realm of the physical sciences, but I don’t wish to parochialize it to
my personal interests.
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Note here that, in such fields as physics, typically more phenomena
will be added to P in the course of experiments conducted to test
the predictions of τ.
As a thorough guide to the use of prediction, this is obviously un-
derdeveloped. But we’re not at the moment concerned with general
scientific methodology. We are instead concerned with examining
a method for ascertaining how we should evaluate the degree to
which the predictions of a theory ought to affect our commitment
to the theory. Further, this is put forth, not so much as a principle to
which one ought adhere no matter what, but rather a heuristic. All
else being equal, it seems better to prefer theories whose predictions
or consequences are consistent with the phenomena they wish to
explain, and inconsistent with the opposite phenomena.28 And, all
else being equal, if we’re confronted with a theory whose implica-
tions are consistent with the falsity of some of its other predictions,
this seems to count against this theory’s optimality.
Why is this? The gist is that if a theory implies that conceptually
contradictory things are consistent, or have certain features which
are consistent, this suggests either a fault in the methods by which
the consequences are ascertained or else a fault in the theory itself.
This, in turn, suggests that we ought to amend either (or perhaps
both) of these. In this case, we ought to reject or amend either the
28“Opposite phenomena” might seem a little opaque when speaking of the
natural sciences, since not all predictions have a neat and tidy “opposite.” With
regards to philosophical topics, however, one can get more straightforward oppo-
sites: a state of affairs being conceivable and a state of affairs being inconceivable,
for instance.
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methods used to reach the paradoxical compatibility (that is, my
argument) or the theory we started out with (the royal road).
So why should we accept this sort of heuristic? We should do
so because we use this sort of reasoning quite often already, and to
good effect. More to the point, we use it to good effect in everyday
life. Suppose I judge that it’s raining because I heard a resounding
crash while I was inside studying. On the basis of this, I judge
that the ground outside should be wet. Now, suppose I actually
go outside in about a half-hour and observe that the sun is high in
the sky, the ground is dry, and it isn’t actually raining outside at
that time. Now, certainly, that result is, loosely speaking, consistent
with my hypothesis that it was raining. It could be that I in fact
did hear thunder, but that that only occurred towards the end of the
thunder-shower, and the sun came out immediately after and dried
the ground.
Suppose I say to myself “well, that doesn’t mean that I’m wrong.”
Technically I’m right, because those things are both consistent with
my theory that it’s raining. The point is that this compatibility
should either give me reason to doubt the line of reasoning that led
me to conclude that the actual situation is consistent with my theory,
or else to conclude that the explanation I’ve given of the thunderous
noise (that is was raining) is in fact faulty.
The suggestion is that we use this sort of heuristic all the time,
or at least think we should. Whenever a rational person is faced
with data which conflicts with some pre-existing theoretical com-
mitments, he will often re-examine those commitments, to see if
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they conflict after all. And if his theory is consistent with two mu-
tually exclusive scenarios, that should give him just the slightest bit
of pause, and perhaps lead him to change the views he holds. Such
is–the argument runs–the case with modal monism, and hence with
RR. The fact that the theory is consistent with the conceivability and
the inconceivability of the scenarios we’ve been discussing in the
preceding paragraphs should, all else being equal, give us doubt as
to whether RR is a useful–never mind valid–method for obtaining
knowledge of possibility or necessity.
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Closing Remarks
As the reader may have gathered from the previous chapter, I do
not think the unrestricted use of conceivability to access possibility is
methodologically sound. In this sense, then, there are inconceivable
worlds: worlds which contain aspects which are either irreducibly
inconceivable or conceivable under one (accurate) description and
inconceivable under another (equally accurate) description. But I do
not think that these worlds are strange or terribly peculiar–indeed,
they may go so far as to be wholly familiar.
What use, then, for conceivability? Should it be discarded as
useless, or left unanalyzed as having no philosophical import. The
latter is certainly not my view. Just the opposite: I have spent over
fifty pages under the assumption of its falsehood!
Is it useless? I do not think so, though the reader may have gotten
that impression from the preceding pages. Rather, my view is this:
the unrestricted use of conceivability to discover what is possible is,
in fact, illegitimate. But there may yet be many legitimate uses for
a philosophically elaborated theory of conceivability.
On the level of phenomenology, for instance, conceivability is
quite interesting. What precisely do we do when we conceiveO of
something? What are the characteristic mental processes or ac-
tivities involved? These are non-trivial and potentially complex
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questions. And such questions are, or at any rate ought to be, of
interest to any philosopher.
Further, while conceivability might be a poor way to discover
possibility, it might be a good way to determine compossibility.
While conceivabilityO is subject to our abilities and concepts, and
so is a poor guide to possibility tout court, it may be a good guide to
determining what thing are consistent with our concepts. Similarly
(and more generally), conceivabilityn might be a good way to de-
termine the joint consequences of philosophical positions, much in
the way thought experiments are supposed to do. It might even be
possible to construct a somewhat formal and consistent procedure
using conceivabilityn which would allow thought experiments to
be conducted and assessed in fairly uniform ways.
Whatever the philosophical merits of conceivability, I do not
think that “being a good guide to determining possibility” is among
them. It might be a good guide to what might be true given the beliefs
and knowledge of a particular person. But as a guide to anything
more than highly parochial, agent-bound seeming possibilities, it
seems to be hopelessly flawed. Taken as having some close connec-
tion to possibility, we arrive (I have argued) at the conclusion that
we live in either an impossible world or a world whose possibility
is indeterminate. And this is a paradox. So far from being able to
conclude that inconceivable worlds are impossible, we are led to
conclude, instead, that our world–horses, sea horses, glaciers, su-
permassive black holes, dark matter, gamma ray bursts, and things
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